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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The history of the American banking system is not well-known but it is very important, since it 
has shaped the current financial market of the country. 
The U.S. have gone through both periods of free banking and central banking, since two main 
ways of thinking have collided and interchanged over the years. 
As a matter of fact, several economists, businessmen and politicians have made researches and 
written hundreds of papers in order to find out the best way to structure an efficient banking 
system.  
On the one hand, a central bank might be useless, since free banking could find an efficient and 
solid structure on its own, as any other market could, without external interferences. On the other 
hand, a central bank could be seen as necessary to prevent and smooth crisis, as well as to supervise 
the whole banking system. This is the main driving force of the economy, so it should be monitored 
in order to avoid widespread economic crisis. 
In order to examine as much as possible these fascinating topics, I have chosen to divide my thesis 
in two chapters and in a brief final reflection. 
 
As far as the first chapter is concerned, I have described the history of the American banking 
system chronologically, from the Independence War to the FED establishment in 1913. 
In particular, I have analyzed three main topics:  
1. the First and the Second Bank of the U.S., since they used to be the most important attempts to 
establish a single central bank in the country;  
2. the decentralized banking system, a system without a central bank, in which banks could be 
chartered only by the various states, not by the federal government;  
3. the National Banking System, a system of banks directly chartered directly by the federal 
government. It did not base on a single central bank, in fact, national banks were strictly linked 
one other through a system of pyramidal reserves. 
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As for the second chapter, it starts with a summary of the main judgements by the Supreme Court 
of the U.S.A., which solved debates on key banking issues. Such judgements are historically 
valuable because they set up principles that are still valid nowadays, since the U.S.A. have adopted 
a common-law system. 
In the second part of this chapter I have examined the Suffolk system, that is an example of how 
the market could regulate itself in order to avoid over-emission of notes and bank runs, developing 
several interesting banking practices. It is one of the main arguments that support the free banking 
theory.  
The last paragraph of the chapter deals with free banking and central banking.  
Murray N. Rothbard, Walter Bagehot and Vera Smith are the main authors that I have taken into 
consideration in order to depict strengths and weaknesses of the two different banking systems.   
 
The last part of my thesis is a brief personal reflection on the dispute between central banking and 
free banking, taking into consideration the current monetary system, that is a de facto fiat standard. 
As a matter of fact, all the theories I have depicted in the second chapter are conceived assuming 
a gold standard.   
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THE INDEPENDENCE WAR AND THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 
 
 
Before the Independence War, the British colonies in North America had adopted the bimetallic 
monetary system of Great Britain, accepting both British and foreign silver and gold species.  
At the time, bankers were wealthy people lending their own money, since banking, meant as 
lending out the savings of others, began in England in the middle of the seventeenth century.1  
For this reason, very few private banks existed in Colonial America and they were short-lived due 
to the paper money issues.  
Paper money was used for the first time by Massachusetts in 1690 to finance military expeditions 
against French colonies, but soon this method became very dangerous.   
Initially, paper money was born to be an extraordinary lump-sum measure adopted by the colonies, 
which should have been redeemable in species and backed by the state tax revenues of the 
following years. However, further issues were used to cover the “redemption deadlines”, causing 
a huge depreciation of new money in relation to species.   
The colonies tried to face this depreciation giving paper money legal tender for all debts at par 
with species, but, doing this, they triggered the Gresham’s Law2, causing the disappearance of 
species as well as a big inflation wave.  
In this situation, private banks began to issue their own banknotes, as alternatives to the paper 
money issued by the colonies. Banknotes were either redeemable in silver, in case they were issued 
by silver banks, or irredeemable in the case of issuance by land banks.   
Private banks worsened the inflation crisis, forcing the British Parliament to outlaw them in 1741. 
In 1751 Great Britain prohibited all further issues of legal tender paper money in New England 
and ordered a move to redemption of existing issues in species. 
Finally, in 1764, the British Parliament extended the prohibition of new issues to the other  
American colonies and required the gradual retirement of outstanding notes. 
 
 
                                                
1 Merchants used to deposit their savings in the Royal Mint until 1638, when King Charles I confiscated the gold in 
order to fund war. Even if the gold was given back, merchants started to deposit their surplus in private goldsmiths, 
using warehouse receipts as a sort of surrogate money. Goldsmiths started to lend receipts which were not entirely 
covered by gold after the British Civil War, in 1660s: fractional reserve banking began. 
 
2 Gresham’s Law is the monetary principle according to which bad money drives out the good one.  
People are indeed eager to keep the money whose intrinsic value is at par or higher than the nominal one, but to 
exchange it conversely.  
Gresham’s Law caused the failure of the bimetallic monetary systems. 
 6 
The Independence War broke out in 1775, and the Continental Congress decided to finance 
military expenses by an emission of $2 million of paper money, which were to be initially retired 
in seven years through taxes levied pro rata by the separate states.  
The issuance of these “Continental papers” rapidly escalated during the following years due to the 
big expenses for the war and the subsequent reconstruction: over $225 million were issued in five 
years, starting from an initial money supply of $12 million. As a result, a new inflation crisis 
stemmed by the various states with a new emission of their own paper money. Anyway, that paper 
money took little time to depreciate a lot too.  
In the end, the “Continental papers” were not redeemed at all, while the “State papers” were 
redeemed at depreciating rates.  
The same policy was not applied to loan certificates, another source of financing used by the 
Continental Congress and then by the various states. They were notes issued by government to pay 
for supplies and accepted by the merchants as currency. These notes were not redeemed at 
depreciating rates because of the considerable influence of two important men: Alexander 
Hamilton, the future Secretary of Treasure, and Robert Morris, a wealthy merchant and economic 
advisor of Congress.  
Indeed, they wanted the redemption at par of all the public debt for two reasons: 
- offering the businessmen who had bought these notes the chance to get their money back and 
reinvest it in a more productive way (trickle-down effect); 
- building up agitation to modify the Articles of Association3 that refused to allow to the federal 
government taxes power. Under the Articles, Congress was forced to rely on requisitions upon the 
governments of its member states. Without the power to independently raise its own revenues, 
Congress was steadily vulnerable to the discretion of the several State governments: each State 
used to make its own decisions as to whether to pay the requisition or not. Some states were not 
giving Congress the funds it asked for by either paying them only partially, or by altogether 
ignoring the requests from Congress. Without the revenue to enforce its laws and treaties, or to 
pay its debts and without an enforcement mechanism to compel the States to pay, the 
Confederation was basically rendered impotent and was in danger of falling apart. 
Morris and Hamilton thought that the repayment of the public debt had to be realized using a sort 
of “federal tax revenues” in the following years indeed. 
 
                                                
3 In 1774, the Continental Congress adopted the Articles of Association in response to the “Intolerable Acts” the 
British government had imposed on the colonies. This document proposed a boycott on the import and export of goods 
from Britain and its other colonies, as well as clauses announcing a ban of the slave trade, severance of all economic 
ties with Britain and the intention to improve agriculture and industry in the U.S. 
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They achieved the result with the enactment of the article 1, section 8, clause 1 of the American 
Constitution of the 1787: “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts 
and excises to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United 
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” 
 
Robert Morris is important in the American banking history because he was the thinker and the 
head of the Bank of North America, the first privately owned central bank in U.S. which 
received its federal charter in 1782. It was also the first fractional reserve commercial bank in the 
country. The monetary system was indeed grounded on species, but with a controlled monetary 
inflation pyramiding an expansion of money and credit upon a reserve of specie.   
The new bank had an initial capital of $400.000, payable in gold and silver, to be increased by new 
subscriptions from time to time, at the pleasure of the twelve directors, who were chosen by the 
shareholders and were to be entrusted with the management of the institution.  
It received a monopoly license from the Congress: only its banknotes could be used as currency to 
pay duties and taxes all over the states governments and no other bank was allowed to operate in 
the country. In exchange, the bank was obliged to lend government a considerable amount of  
“fresh money”, acquiring part of the public debt.  
The Bank of North America became the depository of all congressional funds. 
Despite Morris power and influence, the new banknotes depreciated early because of the market 
lack of confidence in the repayment at par with species. After a year, his political power came to 
an end and the rumors about conflict of interests between the bank and politicians, as well as the 
threat of the disappearance of the species due to Gresham’s Law, caused his bank the loss of the 
leading role acquired, becoming a private commercial institution chartered by the state of 
Pennsylvania. 
In 1783, all the federal government stocks in the bank were sold by Morris into private hands and 
all U.S. debt to the bank was repaid. 
The first experiment of central banking in U.S. was very short-lived. 
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THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 1791 – 1811 
 
In 1790 Alexander Hamilton, who became Secretary of Treasure of the young U.S., submitted four 
financial reports to Congress. The most important ones were “The First Report on Public Credit”, 
“The Second Report on Public Credit”, known also as “Report on a National Bank”, and “The 
Report on the Establishment of a Mint.”4 
The last report proposed that minting a U.S. dollar weighting almost as much as the Spanish peso 
would have been the simplest way to introduce a national currency. The Spanish currency was the 
most circulated one at the time indeed. Hamilton suggested adopting a bimetallic currency at a 
fixed 15:1 ratio of silver-to-gold. He desired the minting of small value coins to reduce the cost of 
living for the poor and wanted people to get used to handling money on a frequent basis. 
Hamilton’s principles were adopted by Congress with the “Coinage Act of 1792”, that provided 
the basic framework which all subsequent coinage production was based on. 
The Act authorized the construction of the U.S. Mint in Philadelphia and established the silver 
dollar as the unit of money, declaring it to be lawful tender, and created a decimal system for U.S. 
currency. 
 
The first report analyzed the financial standing of the U.S. and recommended the reorganization 
of the national debt and the establishment of public credit. Hamilton divided public debt in federal 
and state debt giving an estimation of the combined burden, which amounted to $77 million. He 
suggested paying in full all government debts5 as the foundation for establishing government 
credit, to create a favorable climate for investment in government securities and to transform the 
public debt into a source of capital.  
                                                
4 The other was the Report on Manufactures, which proposed a series of subsidies to industry, tariffs, trade regulations 
and other government encouragements that would promote the growth of manufacturing and immigration, as well as 
expanding the applications of technology and science in all economic sectors.  
Hamilton thought that those measures would secure the American independence, creating a sound economic system. 
The principal ideas of the Report became laws only in the first half of the nineteenth century, due to the initial 
opposition of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.  
 
5 The other two debt repayment schemes proposed were the “repudiation” and the “discrimination” of public debt.  
Repudiation meant defaulting of some portions of the domestic debt, while the foreign debt should have been repaid 
in full.   
Schemes more in sympathy with the former-soldiers who had relinquished their certificates to speculators at reduced 
rates were termed “discrimination”. These called for paying the original holder of the security at full value, and 
reimbursing the current holder of the security for its purchase price. The combined payments would have, 
however, exceeded the denomination of the original certificate. 
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Regular payments of interests and principals would allow Congress to safely increase federal 
money supply and to stimulate capital investments in agriculture and manufacturing.  
With economic prosperity, the enterprises would carry their tax burdens and provide the revenue 
to service the national debt more easily. 
“The key provision in this report was termed “assumption”, called for the thirteen states to 
consolidate their outstanding debt of $25 million and transfer it to the central government for 
servicing under the general funding plan. 
Hamilton’s chief objectives were both economic and political. Economically, state securities were 
vulnerable to local fluctuations in value, and consequently, to speculative buying and selling 
activities that would threaten the integrity of a national credit system. Furthermore, with each 
state legislature formulating separate repayment plans, the federal government would be forced 
to compete with states for sources of tax revenue. Politically, Hamilton sought to tie the creditors 
to the new central government by linking their financial fortunes to the success of his economic 
nationalism. This would gradually cause decline in state authority, and a relative increase in 
Federal influence.”6 
 
“The Report on a National Bank” was linked to the previous one, since Hamilton argued that a 
new central bank was necessary to make loans to the government, to allow the public debt 
repayment, to act as custodian of federal funds, to collect tax revenues for the government, to 
create a common currency and thus to boost the whole American economy. 
Hamilton’s proposal was quickly accepted by the Congress, which chartered the First Bank of the 
United States on February 25th in 1791. 
The bank was established in Philadelphia with an initial funding by the sale of $10 million in 
stocks, of which $2 million in shares purchased by the government through a loan of the bank 
itself that had to be paid back in ten equal annual installments.  
The remaining $8 million were available to the public, both American and foreigners7, with an 
additional requirement: one-quarter of the purchase price had to be paid in specie.8 
                                                
6 Brock W.R., 1957. “The Ideas and Influence of Alexander Hamilton in Essays on the Early Republic: 1789-
1815.” Ed. Leonard W. Levy and Carl Siracusa. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.  
 
7 Even if foreigner investors could buy the shares, they would have not got any voting right. Additionally, loans to 
foreigners had to be approved by the Congress, as well as loans to the single states. 
 
8 The First Bank of the United States could technically make loans up to $10 million, backed by only $2 million in 
species. 
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The bank structure was modelled on the Bank of England, but its chartered functions were actually 
different: the Bank acted as the federal government’s fiscal agent, collecting tax revenues, securing 
the government’s funds, making loans to the government, transferring government deposits 
through the bank’s branch network and paying the government’s bills.  
The bank also managed the US Treasury’s interest payments to European investors in U.S. 
government securities. 
In addition to its activities on behalf of the government, it also operated as a commercial bank, 
which meant that it accepted deposits from the public and made loans to private citizens and 
businesses. Its banknotes most commonly entered circulation through the loan process. It extended 
more loans and issued more currency than any other bank in the nation because it was the largest 
financial institution in the U.S. and the only institution holding federal government deposits as 
well as possessing branches throughout the nation.  
The bank had a twenty-years charter running, after which it was up to Congress to approve or deny 
renewal of the bank and its charter. However, during that time no other federal bank had to be 
authorized, while states were free to charter as many intrastate banks they wished. 
The bank was forbidden to buy government bonds, issue notes and incur debts beyond its actual 
capitalization. Additionally, it had a mandatory rotation rule for the board of the twenty-five 
directors9 and it was put under supervision of the Secretary of the Treasure, who was free to 
remove government deposits, inspect the books and require statements regarding bank’s condition 
as frequently as once a week. 
Thomas Willing, who had been president of the Bank of North America, accepted the job as the 
national bank’s first president. 
During the IPO, the largest and the second in the country after the Bank of North America one, 
the First Bank did not offer shares for immediate delivery, but rather subscriptions payable in 
specie, that acted as a down payment on the purchase of bank stock. Investors would have paid the 
balance due over the course of the next two years using specie for the 25% and debt securities for 
the remaining part. 
A financial bubble began to grow soon, due to the high demand of subscriptions that more than 
doubled their price and pushed up also the price of U.S. debt securities. 
One of the primary causes of the Panic of 1792 was the failure of a scheme created by some bankers 
in the winter of 1791.  
                                                
 
9 Because of the great distances some board members had to travel to get to meetings in Philadelphia, the presence of 
at least seven directors was deemed sufficient to conduct bank business. The board members included lawyers, 
merchants, brokers as well as several senators and congressmen. 
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They planned to use large loans to gain control of the U.S. debt securities market because other 
investors needed those securities to make payments on stocks in the First Bank of the United 
States. These bankers were able to create their own credit by endorsing one another’s notes, and 
did so hoping to create a new bank in New York in order to overtake the existing one.  
On March 1792, a banker named William Duer stopped making payments to his creditors and 
simultaneously faced a lawsuit for illegal actions he had taken as first assistant of Secretary 
Hamilton in the 1780s.  
As Duer defaulted on his contracts and found himself in prison, the price of securities fell more 
than 20% quite quickly. The failure of the Duer’s bank caused a big bank run. 
Hamilton saw the need for intervention as the earlier financial bubble kept collapsing: credit was 
becoming less available and the collapse of prices across the economy became increasingly a 
concern. He met the members of the Treasury’s sinking fund commission10, which decided to 
authorize purchases of government securities in the marketplace. 
The relief was only temporary because new speculative waves hit the U.S. debt securities market 
during the year. The other factor that contributed to this wild speculation was the huge flood of 
loans and banknotes that the First Bank had caused both indirectly, as investor borrowed money 
from other banks to obtain the shares, and directly, making loans and issuing its own banknotes. 
When in 1792 the First Bank suddenly slowed the over-expansion of loans and banknotes, other 
banks followed suit, creating another credit crunch. 
Prices of U.S. government securities started to drop and speculators started to lose a lot of money. 
Some big speculators debt became so overwhelming and the number of people and companies they 
had borrowed from so large that their default led to a widespread financial contagion. 
The Panic of 1792 was solved again by the Treasury’s sinking fund that calmed the markets 
acquiring government bonds to smooth the price fall. 
Unlike modern central banking, the First Bank of U.S. did not officially set monetary policy nor it 
regulated other banks. However, by managing its lending policies and the flow of funds through 
its accounts, the bank could alter the supply of money and credit in the economy and hence the 
level of interest rates charged to borrowers. 
The First Bank of U.S. was one of the largest corporations in America, since eight branches were 
opened from 1792 to 180511 and it could influence the entire economy due to its dimension. 
                                                
 
10 The federal sinking fund was a cash surplus that the Treasury could use to buy government securities in the open 
market to retire some of its debt before the maturity. 
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At the time, when a bank had to grant a loan, it used to give the borrower banknotes redeemable 
in species or it credited the borrower’s account on the bank’s book. Furthermore, deposits and 
loans were related, since banks with more deposits were able to make more loans and then to inject 
more money in the economy. 
The First Bank of the U.S. used to receive all government deposits and therefore could make more 
loans than any other bank. 
Since it used to accumulate also the notes of the state banks and held them in its vault too, it could 
indirectly influence the money supply. In case it wanted to slow the growth of money and credit, 
it would present the notes for redemption in gold or silver, thereby reducing state banks’ reserves 
and their issue of banknotes and loans. To speed up the growth of money and credit, the First Bank 
held on to the state banks’ notes, thereby increasing state bank’s reserves. 
In addition, the banknotes issued by the First Bank were widely accepted throughout the country 
and were the only ones accepted for payment of federal taxes. Its branches were located in the 
main port cities, making it easier for the federal government to collect customs duties and to sell 
U.S. securities to foreigners, while the Bank could easily finance international trade. 
 
In 1800, there were 28 state banks in U.S., while in 1811 their number escalated to 117 due to the 
economic development, which recovered quickly from the Panic of 1792, and due to the great 
monetary expansion pursued by the First Bank of the U.S. 
When the time of re-chartering the Bank came in 1811, the re-charted bill was defeated by one 
vote both in the House and in Senate. 
The re-chartering process was fought and defeated by James Madison administration and the 
Democratic-Republicans, including the hard-money12 Old Republican forces, which had always 
been in opposition with Alexander Hamilton principles.  
Despite the support from the merchants, the chambers of commerce and the state banks, the First 
Bank of the U.S. era came to an end. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 Boston (1792) – New York (1792) – Charleston, SC (1792) – Baltimore (1792) – Norfolk, VA (1800) – Savannah 
(1802) – Washington, D.C. (1802) – New Orleans (1805). 
 
12 Hard money policies, opposed to fiat money policies, support a specie standard, usually gold or silver. 
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THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 1816-1833 
 
The war of 1812-181513 caused serious consequences for the American monetary system.  
The government encouraged the formation of new banks in the Mid-Atlantic, Southern and 
Western states, which printed huge quantities of new notes to purchase government bonds and 
therefore to finance military expenditures. From 1811 to 1815, the number of banks in the country 
increased from 117 to 212. Even 35 private unincorporated banks, which were illegal in most states 
but were allowed to function under war conditions, were established. 
Only the banks of New England maintained a conservative position, since only a little part of 
public debt was purchased there to avoid an inflation crisis. However, the government was paying 
goods and services in New England with a mass of banknotes which came from the other regions 
and were clearly worthless. 
New England banks called for redemption of the notes soon and in 1814 the government was 
forced to suspend specie payments, giving legal tender to the banknotes.  
The number of banks and credit expanded rapidly during 1815: specie in all banks amounted to 
$13,5 million, while banknotes and deposits amounted to $79 million. 
 
Another cause of the wartime inflation was the massive issue of Treasury notes, which were 
quickly used as currency, as during the Independence War. Their quasi-legal tender status brought 
once more Gresham’s Law into operation and specie started to flow out to the country. 
The U.S. could not have continued indefinitely with the issue of fiat money by a poll of individual 
banks, which did not operate together.  
The first solution was proposed by the Old Republicans and the Federalists: the federal government 
should have compelled the banks to redeem the notes, forcing the liquidation of those ones which 
could not have done it. In that way, the mass of depreciated notes and deposits would have been 
liquidated and specie would have come back. 
The Democratic-Republican administration wanted to move the country toward a more uniform, 
stable paper currency establishing instead a new central bank, the Second Bank of the U.S. 
Congress passed a bill in 1814 to charter a second national bank, but Madison vetoed it.  
In 1816, Congress passed another bill to charter the bank and Madison was forced to sign the act 
due to the need to solve the post-war financing distress of the country. 
 
                                                
13 The causes of the war between the U.S. and U.K. were mainly linked to the restrictions the U.K. imposed on 
maritime trade due to its war with France, the support given by the U.K to the natives, which were opposing to the 
American expansion towards the western regions, and the American interest for Canada, that was still a British colony. 
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The Second Bank of the U.S. was modelled as its forerunner. It acted as fiscal agent for the federal 
government, holding its deposits, making its payments and helping it to issue debt to the public.  
It issued and redeemed banknotes and kept state bank’s issue of notes in check as well as operating 
as commercial bank that accepted deposits and made loans both to business and individuals. 
This Bank had a twenty-year charter too and its board consisted of twenty-five directors. Not all 
the directors were elected by the shareholders, since five of them had to be appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate.  
The capitalization of the bank was considerably higher than its forerunner: it amounted to 35$ 
million, of which 20% was held by the federal government.  
Subscriptions went on sale in July 1816 and the sale period was set at three weeks. To make it 
easier for investors to buy them, sales were held in twenty cities. After the deadline, $3 million of 
subscriptions remained unsold and they were finally bought by Stephen Girard14. 
At last, four thousand private investors held 80% of the bank’s capital, including one thousand 
Europeans, even if the bulk of the stocks were held by a few hundred wealthy Americans.  
At the time, the institution used to be the largest monied corporation in the world. 
The Second Bank reach was far greater than that of its predecessor, since its branches were twenty-
five, compared to the only eight of the First Bank. 
In that era of poor communications and high transportation costs, the tendency for a banknote was 
to depreciate in proportion to its distance from the home office of the issuing bank. 
A class of professional money-brokers emerged. They bought up a mass of depreciated notes of 
nominally specie-paying banks and then travelled to their home offices asking for redemption. 
Banknotes detectors were monthly journals published by money-brokers helping people to 
evaluate the market rate of various banknotes in relation to specie.  
“Wildcat banks” were banks located in “wildcat countries”, where money-brokers found it difficult 
to travel, therefore they were less worried about the redemption of their notes. 
The extensive branch network faced this issue and aided the country’s westward expansion and its 
economic growth in several ways: the branches provided credit to businesses and farmers, helping 
to finance the production of goods and crops as well as the shipment of those ones to domestic and 
foreign destinations. Moreover, the network helped moving the money deposited in the branches 
to other parts of the nation, facilitating both the government’s ability to make payments and the 
branches’ ability to supply credit. 
                                                
14 Stephen Girard was a French-born, naturalized American philanthropist and banker. His bank was the principal 
source of government credit during the War of 1812, since he underwrote up to 95% of the war loan issue enabling 
the U.S. to carry on the war. After the war, he became one the wealthiest people in the U.S. From an estimation based 
on the ratio of his fortune to contemporary GDP, Girard is considered one of wealthiest Americans of all time. 
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The Second Bank’s capitalization and ramification allowed it to conduct a rudimentary monetary 
policy, as the First Bank used to. 
The first president of the Second Bank of U.S., William Jones, actually failed to control properly 
paper money emission, due to the lack of courage to insist on payment of its notes from the state 
banks. “So many influential people were interested in the state banks as stockholders that it was 
not advisable to give offense by demanding payment in specie, and borrowers were anxious to 
keep the banks in the humor to lend.”15 
The Second Bank’s attempt to provide a uniform currency throughout the U.S. floundered on the 
fact that the Western and Southern branches could inflate credit and banknotes, which would have 
to be redeemed at par by the more conservative branches in New York and Boston. 
Therefore, the conservative branches were stripped of specie, while the others could continue to 
issue notes without brakes. 
The expansionary operations of the Second Bank, coupled with its laxity toward insisting on specie 
payments by the state banks, caused an increase of incorporated banks, from 232 in 1816 to 338 
in 1818. Some of them were chartered for the express purpose of extending credit to speculators 
and to provide easy credit to high-risk debtors.  
Exports rose from $81 million in 1815 to a peak of $116 million in 1818 and prices rose greatly in 
real estate, land, farm improvement projects and slaves. General boom conditions expanded stock 
trading so rapidly that traders, who used to buy and sell stocks on the curbs on Wall Street for 
nearly a century, found it necessary to open the New York Stock Exchange in March 1817, which 
was the first indoor stock exchange in the country. 
In July 1818, the enormous inflation of money and credit, aggravated by frauds and corruption 
among Second Bank’s branches and state banks, put the Second Bank in real danger to sustain 
specie payments. In January 1819, William Jones was replaced by Langdon Cheves. 
 
Over the next year, the Second Bank began to cut loans, to acquire specie from abroad, to enforce 
state banks to redeem their debts in specie and to contract credit in the South and in the West, 
refusing to provide uniform national currency by redeeming their notes at par. 
These choices saved the Second Bank, but contributed to bring the U.S. in its first widespread 
economic and financial depression: the Panic of 181916. 
                                                
15 Catterall C. H. Ralph, 1902. “The Second Bank of the United States” Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press 
 
16 The Panic of 1819 was caused also by international events. For instance, the growth of crop yields and 
manufacturing in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars reduced the demand for American products. 
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The contraction of money and credit was massive: total money supply fell from $103,5 million in 
1818 to $74,2 million in only one year.  
A lot of banks started to fail and some others suspended specie payments in most parts of the 
country: the number of incorporated banks fell from 341 in mid-1819 to 267 three years later. 
Many businessmen and manufacturers went bankrupt and unsound investments made during the 
post war boom were liquidated. Prices in general plummeted and both imports and exports of U.S. 
dropped.  
In 1823, Langdon Cheves withdrew his name from consideration for reelection as president of the 
Second Bank of U.S. and Nicholas Biddle became the new leader.   
The latter had served on the Bank’s board of directors and with his guidance, the Bank contributed 
significantly to post-recession economic stability and growth. He increased the number of notes 
issued by the Second Bank and restrained the expansion of other banknotes by pressing state banks 
to redeem them in specie. 
The charter of the Second Bank of the U.S. was up for renewal in 1836, but Biddle filed for renewal 
earlier, in 1831, before the re-election of Andrew Jackson, who had always been a detractor of 
central banking. 
Indeed, president Jackson, who was elected in 1828, denounced the Second Bank in his first annual 
message, in 1829. The Jacksonians were hard-money libertarians: they favored free enterprise and 
free markets, but they strongly opposed special subsidies and monopoly privileges conveyed by 
government to businesses or to any other group, as the Second Bank and its forerunners.  
Triumphantly re-elected in 1832, President Jackson lost no time in disestablishing the Second 
Bank as central bank. 
In 1833, he removed the public Treasury deposits from the Second Bank and placed them in several 
state banks, known as “pet banks”, throughout the country. The original pet banks were 7, but 
since the President was not interested in creating another privileged oligarchy, the number 
increased to 91 by the end of 1836. 
In the latter year, the Second Bank of the U.S. became a private corporation under Pennsylvania 
law and continued to operate until 1841, when it was liquidated. 
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THE DECENTRALIZED BANKING SYSTEM 1837 – 1863 
 
From 1833 to 1837, total specie in the U.S. rose from $31 million to $73 million. 
The enormous increase in specie was the result of both the large influx of silver coins from Mexico 
and the cut in the usual export of silver to the Orient.17 
Banks in U.S. started to issue more notes and loans due to this plenty of specie, driving up prices. 
The early 1830s boom was led also by the construction of the first railway network in the country, 
that started from the Eastern regions to arrive to the Western ones.  
The federal government took advantage from the territory expansion selling millions of acres of 
public land in the western regions to speculators, who re-sold the land to the settlers once the 
railway arrived, gaining from the price improvement of the land.  
The government was hoarding a huge budget surplus, therefore in 1836 President Jackson ordered 
to distribute it proportionately to the states, which re-invested the money in new investments in 
the West. The distribution was made in notes payable in specie. 
 
In August 1836, Andrew Jackson decided to stop the speculation in Western public lands, 
decreeing that public land payments would have to be made only in specie (“Specie Circular”). 
However, banks did not have enough specie to redeem all their notes and started to go bankrupt: 
the Panic of 1837 began. 
As the previous financial crisis, the Panic of 1837 was compounded even by external factors.  
The Bank of England, worried about the inflation in Britain and the outflow of gold, tightened the 
money supply and raised interest rates to draw gold and fill its monetary reserves. 
As a result, credit contraction restricted the American cotton export18 trade in London, exports 
declined, cotton prices fell and capital started to flow to England. 
The major banks in the U.S. were forced to raise interest rates as well with damaging effects. 
                                                
17 Mexican government issued a huge amount of paper money, which drove silver coins out of the country.  
The American silver export to the Orient fell because China began to reduce the import of the valuable metal to 
increase the opium one. 
 
18 The U.S. economy, especially in the Southern states, was heavily dependent on stable cotton prices.  
Receipts from cotton sales provided funding some schools, balanced nation’s trade deficit, fortified the U.S. dollar 
and procured foreign exchange earnings in British pound sterling, the world’s reserve currency at that time. 
The U.S. was still a predominantly agricultural economy, therefore a collapse in cotton prices caused massive 
reverberations. 
 18 
Throughout 1837, the outflow of specie from the country was reversed due to the higher interest 
rates, but the money supply fell from $276 million to $232 million and people started to distrust 
banks. 
In 1838, Britain resumed easy credit, cotton prices rose and a short-lived recovery began, but in 
1839 the Panic came back. 
During the boom, state governments borrowed a lot of money issuing bonds to finance public 
works: $26,5 million in 1830; $66,5 million in 1835; $170 million in 1839. 
The fall of money supply and prices, the crisis of credit banking and the higher level of interest 
rates brought these state debts into jeopardy.  
The Contraction of 1839 lasted four years and it was basically a debt crisis.  
The Federalists and British bankers asked the federal government to bail out the states and assume 
their debts, but the American people spurned federal aid, because they thought that the lack of help 
to the states would have the effect of cutting their spending, avoiding so the imposition of tax 
burden to pay for bonds interests and principals.  
Without federal bailout, unsound investments were liquidated soon and many banks went 
bankrupt.  
By 1847 Mississippi, Arkansas, Michigan and Florida had repudiated all or part of their debts, 
while Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Arkansas and Pennsylvania had defaulted from three 
to six years before resuming payments. 
 
From 1830s, Jackson administration enacted also some important provisions that affected the 
entire monetary system of the U.S.  
The Jacksonians were determined to eliminate paper money, substituting it with specie or, at the 
most, with paper 100% backed by gold or silver. They were eager to eliminate small-denominated 
banknotes, substituting gold and silver coins for them. 
Therefore, on federal level, they levied a tax on small banknotes, as well as prevented the federal 
government from issuing small-denominated notes as well as accepting them as taxes payments. 
Furthermore, with the “Coinage Act of 1834” they raised the dollar silver-to-gold weight ratio 
from its 1792 level of 15:1 to 16:1, setting the mint price for silver at a level below its international 
market price to attract more gold. 
To stimulate the circulation of both gold and silver, the Jacksonians legalized the circulation of all 
foreigner silver and gold coins. 
They established new branches of the U.S. mint to coin gold discovered in Georgia and North 
Carolina and silver discovered in New Orleans.  
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However, in the early 1850s, Gresham’s Law was triggered by the sudden discovery of gold mines 
in California, Russia and Australia, which increased gold production and pushed down its price 
relative to silver up to 15,3:1.  
The market premium of American silver dollars over gold quickly rose above the estimated cost 
of shipping silver coins abroad and the result was a rapid disappearance of silver from the country. 
Gold coins were flowing into the country, but they were too valuable to be usable for small-
denominated coins, therefore millions of dollars of illegal small denominated banknotes began to 
flood into circulation. 
Congress decided to keep the de jure bimetallic standard in 1853, at the same time adopting a de 
facto gold standard, debasing by 7% the new silver coins with legal tender up to $5. 
At that depreciated rate, silver was not overvalued in relation to gold anymore and remained in 
circulation. 
In 1857, Congress decided to eliminate all legal tender power of foreign coins.19 
 
The Jacksonians had no intention of leaving a permanent system of pet banks, because they wanted 
to keep federal funds safe in case of bank runs. Therefore, after Jackson’s retirement at the end of 
1836, Martin Van Buren tried to establish the Independent Treasury System. As a consequence, 
the federal government was not going to confer any special privilege on banks, since it was meant 
to keep its funds purely in specie in its own Treasury vaults or its sub-treasury branches. 
However, the lobbying of state banks prevented the proposal from becoming law until 1840, when 
the Congress passed the “Independent Treasury Act”.  
This law lasted only one year, because the Democrats lost the elections and the Republicans 
repealed the act. The Democrats took back their majority in the 1844 elections and President James 
Polk finally signed the act in 1846. 
This act held that public revenues had to be retained in the Treasury building and in its branches 
in various cities. The Treasury could thus manage its own funds being completely independent 
from the banking and the financial system of the nation.  
Moreover, all payments by and to the government were to be made in either specie or treasury 
notes.  
 
The Treasury operations influenced strongly the money market, since specie payments to and from 
the government affected the amount of hard money in circulation. 
                                                
19 Only Spanish-American silver coins remained legal tender, even if they would have had to be received quickly by 
government offices and reminted into American coins. 
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From that moment on, the Treasury would have acted as a sort of central bank, becoming one of 
the major forces in the U.S. money market. 
When the Second Bank of the U.S. was eliminated in 1830s, a period of free banking began. 
This “free” banking concept is actually unrelated to the strictly economic one, since the latter is 
linked to a system where entering into banking must be totally free and where the bank must be 
neither subsidized nor regulated. Moreover, a bank must be forced to declare insolvency and close 
at the first sign of failure to redeem its banknotes in specie. 
Before the Civil War, free banking was very different, since the government allowed periodic 
general suspensions of specie payments whenever the banks over-expanded20 and got into trouble.  
Allowing those suspensions, federal and state governments were forced to accept taxes payments 
in banknotes. Moreover, the general prohibition of interstate branch banking greatly inhibited the 
speed by which one bank could demand payment in specie from the others. 
Furthermore, banks were subject to regulations that cast some barriers to entry in the credit market, 
as the ones enacted with the “Michigan Act”, in 1837. 
On the one hand, it granted an automatic charter to any person or group that satisfied established 
criteria, rather than requiring an act of the Michigan legislature each time a new group petitioned 
to open a new bank.21 
On the other hand, the owners of a bank had to purchase state bonds at market value and then 
deposit them with the state auditor22 as collateral. The bank could then issue banknotes up to the 
market value of the bonds, and it was required to redeem its notes on demand in gold or silver 
coin.  
Failure to do so would have caused the closing of the bank and the liquidation of its assets.  
In addition, depositors were granted a lien on bank assets. 
Basically, the banking system of the U.S. before the Civil War was linked to the government bond 
market: the more public debt banks purchased, the more they could create money and lend it out. 
 
In 1838, the State of New York enacted similar legislation with the “Free Banking Act” and other 
states followed soon until 1863. 
                                                
 
20 State usury laws often made credit excessively cheap for the riskiest borrowers, encouraging inflation policies and 
thus speculative expansion of bank lending. 
 
21 Before 1837, a bank charter could be obtained only by a specific legislative act. 
 
22 State auditors (also known as state comptrollers or state controllers) are executive officers of the American 
states who serve as auditors and comptrollers for state funds. It’s an office created by a state Constitution. 
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The U.S. economy expanded rapidly during the 1850s. The acquisitions of Western territories 
following the Mexican War23 and the discovery of gold in California encouraged land speculation 
and railroads establishment.  
Public land sales increased a lot during the Crimean War (1853-1856), since such event 
skyrocketed the European demand for crop. 
The number of banks almost doubled from 1850 to 1857, providing easy credit to their clients. 
New York City became more and more important, since it was the headquarters of the Stock 
Exchange and the financial institutions in which banks across the country deposited their reserve 
funds. 
As the number of banks grew, settlement procedures became more complex. Banks used to settle 
their accounts by employing porters to travel from bank to bank to exchange notes and checks24 
for specie. The official reckoning of accounts, however, took place on Fridays, often resulting in 
record keeping errors and encouraging abuses. 
Furthermore, for buyers, checks were a more convenient, secure and verifiable payment 
instrument, while  they were costlier and riskier for sellers and bank intermediaries, since they 
were exposed to a great default risk.  
Checks required authorization for final settlement, which added several costly and time-consuming 
steps to the clearing process, and exposed the paying bank to greater uncertainty over the timing 
of large withdrawals and therefore to possible liquidity shortfalls. 
Thus, in 1853, the first clearing house of the U.S. was established in New York City. 
It accumulated offsetting credits and debits position of each member bank and then periodically 
(once or twice a day) settled their net positions. 
The settlement was accomplished using certificates, to avoid the daily risk and cost of moving 
currency and specie around. 
Other Clearing Houses were established soon, causing the disappearance of the money-brokers, 
since the former internalized what used to be an informative securities market for banknotes, 
implicitly transferring arbitrage profits. 
                                                
 
23 Mexican War started in 1846, with the secession of Texas from Mexico and its annexation as 28th state of U.S.  
It lasted until 1848, when the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo put an end to the war, granting Texas, California, Nevada, 
Utah, some regions of Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico and Wyoming to the U.S. in exchange for about $18 million. 
 
24 By the mid-nineteenth century, deposit banking rapidly spread in the largest commercial centers and check 
transactions became the preferred payments instrument in local wholesale trade. 
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In August 1857, the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, a major banking institution, went 
bankrupt due to bad investments made especially in agricultural related business, which was 
dropping due to the end of the Crimean War and the subsequent resumption of farm production in 
Europe.  
New York bankers were scared of not being able to meet their financial obligations and so they 
shifted immediately to hard credit policies, demanding immediate payment on all mature loans 
and refusing to accept promissory notes from merchants and other debtors who were short on 
money.  
Stocks plummeted and depositors began to withdraw gold from banks forcing them to quickly 
suspend payments in specie.  
Therefore, the leaders of the New York Clearing House decided to issue loan certificates that could 
be used to settle accounts and were, in effect, quasi-currency, backed not by gold but by state 
banknotes held by member banks. Bearing the words “Payable Through the Clearing House”, 
they were the joint liability of all member banks and thus, in lieu of specie, a safer form of payment.  
The collapse of credit halted the construction of buildings and railroads, while the fall in crop 
prices and in land speculation programs enlarged the crisis even in the Western states, causing 
banks and railways bankruptcies. 
Consequently, the federal government acted to repair the situation by declaring a bank holiday in 
October 1857, in order to cut the risk of further bank failures. 
President James Buchanan thought that paper-money system was the root cause of the Panic, 
therefore he decided to forbid the use of all banknotes denominated under twenty dollars. 
He wanted the state banks to follow the Independent Treasury, of which he trusted it a lot, as he 
said:   
“Thanks to the Independent Treasury, the government has not suspended specie payments, as it 
was compelled to do by the failure of the banks in 1837. It will continue to discharge its liabilities 
to the people in gold and silver. Its disbursements in coin pass into circulation and materially 
assist in restoring a sound currency.” 
Additionally, the government sold revenue bonds25 and Congress enacted the “Tariff Act” of 1857, 
that reduced the average tariff to about 20% and enlarged the list of duty-free items. 
 
In 1859, the U.S. economy was slowly recovering, but the effects lasted until the start of the Civil 
War. 
                                                
25 A revenue bond is a special type of municipal bond distinguished by its guarantee of repayment solely from revenues 
generated by a specified revenue-generating entity associated with the purpose of the bonds, rather than from a tax. 
At that time, revenue bonds were linked mainly to railway projects. 
 23 
CIVIL WAR FINANCING AND THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM 
 
The Civil War26 led to an explosion of federal expenditures, which skyrocketed from $66 million 
in 1861, to $1,3 billion in 1865. 
The Treasury initially financed the war through a $150 million bond issuance, which was 
purchased by the main banks in the country. Part of this bond issuance was composed by non-
interest-bearing Treasury Notes, called Demand Notes because they were payable upon demand 
and redeemable in specie.  
They were used mainly as currency to pay salaries of workers and military personnel.  
The feasibility to redeem the Demand Notes in specie came under pressure in December 1861. 
An increasing public demand for specie due to a lack of confidence in the banking system led to a 
general suspension of specie payments, even for Demand Notes. 
In February 1862, Congress approved the “First Legal Tender Act”, which authorized the printing 
of $150 million in a new currency: the U.S. Note, known also as greenback.  
It was not backed by gold or silver but by government credibility, however it was made legal 
tender for all debts, public and private, except that the Treasury would continue its legal obligation 
of paying the interests on its outstanding public debt in specie27.  
Greenbacks were also made initially convertible at par into U.S. bonds, which remained a generally 
unused option and was repealed a year later. 
The first issuance of greenbacks should have been an emergency one, but a second $150 million 
one (“Second Legal Tender Act”) was authorized in July and still a third $150 million one in 
March 1863 (“Third Legal Tender Act”). 
Greenbacks began to depreciate in relation to specie soon, so the Secretary of the Treasury Salmon 
Chase tried to stop the trend intervening on gold market. He persuaded Congress to levy a stamp 
tax on gold sales and to forbid loans on a collateral of coin above its par value.  
Then he declared that importers would have been allowed to deposit greenbacks at the Treasury 
and receive gold in return at a premium below the market. Importers could use that gold to pay 
customs duties. He supposed that that incentive could have reduced greatly the necessity for 
importers to buy gold on the market and therefore the depreciation of greenbacks. 
                                                
26 The American Civil War was fought from 1861 to 1865 between the Union States and the Confederate States, as a 
result of a long-standing controversy over slavery and states rights. It was the first industrial war, since railways, 
steamships, telegraph and automatic weapons were mass-produced and largely employed.  
The war caused over 600.000 deaths, more than any other war in American history. 
 
27 Congress provided that customs duties would have to be paid in gold or silver because it had to pay interests on 
bonds in specie. In this sense, the Act did not make the greenbacks an unlimited legal tender. 
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With the failure of this first attempt, he sold $11 million in gold to drive down the gold premium 
on greenbacks, but the impact was insignificant because the public knew very well that the 
Treasury could have not pursued this policy indefinitely. 
As a matter of fact, it had to keep enough gold in its vaults to pay interests on bonds. 
In May 1864, Chase sold foreign exchange in London at rates below the market to drive down 
pounds in relation to dollars and so to replace some of the U.S. export demand for gold in England, 
but even this was a failure. 
When, in June 1864, Congress approved of the “Anti-Gold Futures Act”, that prohibited the 
trading of gold futures and criminalized the sale of foreign exchange more than ten days in future, 
the gold market went in chaos, public confidence in the greenback plummeted and its depreciation 
got far worse than before. By the end of the month, the bill was repealed. 
Initially, greenbacks were issued in denominations of $5; $10; $20; $50; $100; $500; $1000, but 
in 1863 the federal government introduced also notes of $1 and $2 because the depreciation was 
driving out of the country even the fractional silver coins. 
As a matter of fact, as soon as the Treasury had suspended specie payments, Gresham’s Law had 
triggered and coin almost disappeared from circulation. 
State banks exploited the suspension of specie payments quickly, printing more and more notes: 
total money supply28 amounted to $745 million in 1860, while by the end of the war it totaled $1.8 
billion. 
After 1863, the U.S. government stopped to issue greenbacks and began to finance the war solely 
through debt and increase in taxes. 
The accumulated deficit piled up during the war was $2.6 billion, of which the printing of 
greenbacks only financed $430 million. 
Taxes revenues increased from $52 million in 1862 to $333 million in 1865. 
 
While the Union used as sources of financing both debt and greenbacks, as well as an increase in 
taxes, the Confederacy financed all its expenditures printing fiat paper, the Southern version of the 
greenback. 
Its total money supply rose from $120 in 1861 to 1.09 billion in 1865. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
28 Total money supply included gold and silver coins, state banknotes and greenbacks. 
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In order to bring financial stability to the country, Congress enacted the “National Banking Acts 
of 1863-1864”, which shaped a new central bank system that would last until Federal Reserve 
system implementation in 1913. 
 
The first purpose of the Acts was to allow the incorporation of national banks, which were 
essentially the same as state banks, except they received their charter from the federal government 
and not from a state one.  
National banks had higher capital requirements and higher reserve requirements than their state 
chartered counterparts. The minimum capital requirement to open a national bank was indeed set 
to $50.000 for rural banks and $200.000 for the larger city banks.  
To improve liquidity and safety they were restricted from making real estate loans and they could 
not lend to any single person an amount exceeding 10% of the bank capital.  
The Acts also established the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency with the responsibility of 
chartering, examining and supervising all national banks, held Treasury securities deposited there 
by national banks and, via the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, it was also responsible for 
printing all national banknotes, in order to guarantee standardization and avoid counterfeiting.  
The second purpose of the Acts was to create a uniform national currency; therefore, all national 
banks were required to accept at par the banknotes of other national banks. 
The third objective of the Acts was to help finance Civil War, creating a more active market for 
Treasury bonds and lowering the cost of borrowing for federal government. 
National banks were required to have one-third of their capital invested in U.S. government bonds, 
depositing them at the U.S. Treasury. 
The volume of notes which a national bank could issue was based on the market value of the U.S. 
Treasury securities the bank held. A national bank was required to keep on deposit with the 
Comptroller of the Currency a sizeable volume of securities. In exchange, the bank received 
banknotes worth 90% of the market value of the deposited bonds. 
To eliminate the possibility that national banks could buy Treasury bonds just to issue more 
banknotes to buy even more bonds, national banks were not allowed to buy government securities 
with their banknotes.  
The Secretary of the Treasury Chase wanted national banks to replace state banks in order to create 
a uniform currency and to prevent Gresham’s Law from working against the newly issued national 
banknotes. Since state banknotes were depreciating a lot, they were dominating the currency 
indeed. 
To reduce the proliferation of state banks and their notes, Congress imposed a 10% tax on all 
outstanding state banknotes with the “National Banking Acts of 1865-1866.” 
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Many state banks decided to convert to national bank charters soon, because the tax burden made 
state banking initially unprofitable. 
By 1870 there were 1638 national banks and only 325 state banks. 
 
The National Banking System created three sets of national banks: the central reserve city ones, 
which were initially located only in New York, then in Chicago and in St. Louis; the reserve city 
ones, located in other cities with over 500.000 population and the country ones, which included 
all other national banks. 
Central reserve city banks were required to keep 25% of their notes and deposits in reserve of 
“lawful money”, which included gold, silver and greenbacks. 
Reserve city banks had to keep one-half of their 25% required reserve in its vault, while the other 
half could be deposited in central reserve city banks. 
Finally, country banks had to keep a minimum reserve ratio of 15% and only the 40% of that 
reserve had to be kept internally. The other 60% could be deposited either at reserve city banks or 
at central reserve city ones. 
Central reserve city banks could count the deposits of reserve city and country banks as part of 
their reserves; likewise, reserve city banks could count the deposits of country banks as part of 
their own reserve requirements. 
The formation of a national and hierarchical banking system centered on New York City boosted 
the diffusion of checks even in the long-distance wholesale trade.  
 
The problems that led to the establishment of the clearing houses across the U.S. were further 
simplified by the creation of the bank draft. The latter also required clearing and settlement, but 
with fewer steps and significantly lower risk. It was a liability of the payer’s bank, and was 
authorized and settled by its correspondent, typically located in a more accessible commercial-
financial center. Moreover, through the sale of drafts to customers, banks could more readily 
manage their portfolio of clearing reserves to avoid costly liquidity shortfalls. 
After 1870, the spread of checking accounts and the lax restrictions of state government fueled the 
growth of state banks, since they had lower reserve and capital requirements, could make more 
type of loans and had fewer restrictions on bank branches. 
Even the post-war reconstruction, the boom of the railways and again the speculation on land 
projects contributed to overheat the banking system: too much capital was involved in projects 
that offered no immediate or early returns. 
As a matter of fact, the number of national banks increased from 1294 in 1865 to 1968 in 1873; 
while state banks rose from 349 to 1330 in the same period.  
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PANICS OF THE END OF THE CENTURY AND ROAD TO THE FED 
 
Jay Cooke & Company failed in 1873. This important bank had been the first brokerage house, 
pioneering the use of telegraph messages to confirm securities transactions with clients. 
It had helped sell many of the bonds issued by the government during the Civil War and then it 
had underwritten the financing of Great Northern Railway in exchange for bonds29, overextending 
itself.  
In September 1873, the bank found itself unable to market several million dollars in those bonds 
and declare bankruptcy, setting off a chain reaction of bank failures and a temporarily closure of 
the NYSE. 
By November, 55 railroads failed and another 60 went bankrupt by 1874. Unemployment 
skyrocketed. 
Many banks failed, except the ones members of the New York Clearing House. 
During normal times, many papers related to banks stability were published by the NY Clearing 
House to provide as much information as possible to investors. 
However, during the panics, lending programs in the form of loan certificates backed by safe 
collaterals were arranged between the Clearing House and the members that were in financial 
distress. 
These programs were kept secret to the public and the publication of all individual banks 
information were suspended in order to avoid bank runs. 
Moreover, the Clearing House put severe restrictions on deposits convertibility into cash. 
 
In 1877, the market for lumber crashed due to the crisis of the railway industry that sent several 
lumbering into bankruptcy.  
The Panic of 1873 and the following economic crisis eliminated unsound banks, industries and 
investments. The situation began to improve only in 1879, with the beginning of great waves of 
immigration which lasted until 1920s. 
 
 
 
                                                
29 Railway industry used to obtain liquidity in two ways: through banking loans and through issuances of bonds, that 
were sold both to banks and to people. 
Great Northern Railway was a common project financed by Jay Cooke and other investors, which then went bankrupt 
too. That pool of investors provided liquidity to build the railway in exchange for bonds that should have been placed 
by Jay Cooke in the market. 
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After the Panic of 1873, a group of 17 bankers of New York City planned the first convention of 
the American Bankers Association.  
In 1875, the ABA was founded “to promote the general welfare and usefulness of banks and 
banking institutions, and to secure uniformity of action, together with the practical benefits to be 
derived from personal acquaintance and from the discussion of subjects of importance to the 
banking and commercial interests of the country, and especially in order to secure the proper 
consideration of questions regarding the financial and commercial usages, customs and laws 
which affect the banking interests of the entire country, and for protection against loss by crime.”30 
It was first headquartered in New York City and provided professional education via examinations 
and certificates, as an alternative path to careers in banking to collegiate training in finance and 
law. It organized its activities through sections focused on peculiar bank types: trust company 
section was organized in 1896, followed by one for clearing houses in 1899, savings banks in 1902 
and state bankers’ associations in 190831. 
 
Another cause of the Panic of 1873 was the demonetization of silver.  
After Civil War, Congress decided the time had come to face the problem concerning the 
resumption of the U.S. notes.  
Supporters of the greenbacks were many manufacturers who desired cheap credit as well as gold 
speculators who were betting on higher gold prices and railroads, which realized that inflation 
benefits debtors. 
However, the Democrats had a far greater proportion of congressmen devoted to hard money and 
to resumption than the fiat-money Republicans. Therefore, they began to propose resolutions to 
withdraw greenbacks and to restore the resumption of notes in specie. 
Until that time, the price of silver used to be so high that a very small amount used to be presented 
at the U.S. Mint in exchange for coins. However, the discovery of new silver mines in Nevada as 
well as the decision of the German Empire and other European countries to cease minting silver 
coins, deciding to use currency backed only by gold, drove down the price of silver. 
                                                
30 Initial Constitution of the ABA. 
 
31 Nowadays, the ABA is headquartered in Washington D.C. and represents banks of all sizes and charters, including 
community banks, regional and money center banks, savings associations, mutual savings banks and trust companies.  
ABA principal activities include: lobbying, professional development for member institution, maintenance of best 
practices and industry standards, consumer education and distribution of products and services.  
It is considered the largest financial trade group in the U.S. 
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If Gresham’s Law had been triggered again, gold would have flowed out of the country and the 
resumption of the greenbacks would have become very complicated. 
 
Therefore, Congress decided to prevent the worst-case scenario with the “Coinage Act of 1873”32, 
moving the U.S. towards a gold standard. The government was not going to buy silver at a statutory 
price any longer and converted the silver acquired from people into silver coins.  
It eliminated the two-cent piece, three-cent silver and half dime, which were still very used in Far 
West regions and authorized the U.S. Mint to create trade dollars, which were silver coins up to 5 
dollars that had to be used only in trade with Far East only, especially with China. 
The Act had the immediate effect of depressing silver prices, hurting Western mining interests and 
investments, but it mostly reduced the money supply, raising interest rates, hurting farmers and 
anyone else who normally carried heavy debt bargains, as railway industries. 
The money supply declined also because of the restricting monetary policy adopted by the Ulysses 
Grant administration, that had raised interest rates even more and had begun to repay the public 
debt contracted during the Civil War. 
 
In 1875, the “Resumption Act” was enacted. The Secretary of Treasure was required to redeem 
greenbacks in specie on demand starting from 1st January 1879. The act allowed the Secretary to 
acquire gold reserves using federal surplus or emissions of government bonds; abolished fees on 
coining gold and substituted silver for any still existing fractional currency.  
Moreover, it set no limits on the quantity of the new national banknotes that could be issued, even 
though greenbacks had to be retired in a proportion of 80% of the new national banknotes issued. 
The agitation for silver grew year by year, since the “Coinage Act of 1873” was considered the 
main cause of a contraction of the economy in 1873.  
In 1878, the “Bland-Allison Act” was enacted as a result of the lobbying of “silver defenders.”  
It required the U.S. Treasury to buy from $2 million to $4 million of silver per month, putting it 
into circulation as silver dollars. 
 
Money supply started growing in 1879 at a rate of about 6% per year until 1897 even due to the 
boom of the American economy. 
After specie resumption in 1879, gold premium to greenbacks fell to par and the appreciating 
currency promoted confidence in gold-backed dollar. More foreigners were willing to hold dollars, 
resulting in an inflow of gold into the U.S. and in greater American exports. 
                                                
 
32 The Act reformed also the organization of the U.S. Mint, that was moved from Philadelphia to Washington.  
 30 
Banks began to increase deposits, from $2,15 billion in 1879 to $2,8 billion in 1882.  
Another financial panic in 1884, coming during a mild contraction of the economy after 1882, 
lowered the money supply again. 
This situation was triggered by the failure of the Marine National Bank of New York City33, even 
if it was caused by an overflow of gold abroad too, since foreigners began to lose confidence in 
the willingness of the U.S. to remain on the gold standard. 
This loss of confidence resulted from the “Bland-Allison Act”, since the shift in treasury balances 
from gold to silver struck a disquieting note in foreign financial circles. 
Despite this contraction, American economy grew steadily in the 1879-1889 decade.  
Inflation decreased year by year, soaring real wages, while long-term bond yields declined due to 
the National Banking System framework, entering the 3% long-term rate which characterized the 
economic giants of that years, like Great Britain. 
The number of farms increased, business rose and new technological discoveries boosted their 
productivity34. 
 
In 1890, the agitation for silver returned. Farmers had immense debts that could not be paid off 
because of the deflation caused by the overproduction during the boom of the 1880s, while mining 
companies had extracted vast quantities of silver, driving down its price below the point at which 
it could be profitably extracted. 
Their renewed wave of lobbying resulted in the “Sherman Silver Purchase Act” of 1890, which 
doubled the amount of silver the federal government was forced to purchase.  
This act required the Treasury to buy silver using special emissions of Treasury notes that could 
be redeemed either in gold or silver. 
Gresham’s Law took over another time: the artificially overvalued silver drove the artificially 
undervalued gold out of circulation35. Foreigners lost confidence in the U.S. gold standard, causing 
a drop in capital imports and severe gold outflows from the country. 
The outflow of gold thus reduced the potential economic growth during the early 1890s. 
Banks began to insert clauses in loans and mortgages requiring payment only in gold coins.  
                                                
33 The bankruptcy was caused by the failure of risky investments in real estate financed mainly through indebtedness, 
which was almost wholly unsecured.  
 
34 In 1880, there were about 4000 farms. In 1890, they were over 4600. 
 
35 People began to exchange gold for silver, even sending it abroad, bringing silver to the Mint to obtain silver coins. 
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Gold exports intensified in 1892 and Treasury’s gold reserve declined. In 1893, the Secretary of 
the Treasury persuaded the New York banks, which had drawn down $6 million on gold from the 
Treasury by presenting bonds for redemption, to return the gold and reacquire the paper. 
In 1893, this monetary crisis, together with another crisis in railroad business, caused another 
financial panic. 
When economy worsened, people rushed quickly to withdraw their money from their accounts 
causing many banks failures. 
At the end of 1893, Grover Cleveland repealed the “Sherman Silver Purchase Act” and allowed 
the Treasury to buy gold from a syndicate of bankers headed by J. P. Morgan and August Belmont, 
restoring confidence in the gold standard. 
Even if the administration mitigated the monetary crisis, the economic depression lasted until 
1897: in total over 15,000 companies and 500 banks failed. 
 
After the Panic of 1893, national banks, especially the central reserve city ones, were becoming 
increasingly unhappy with the National Banking System. 
Centralization was only limited and there was no governmental central bank to coordinate inflation 
and to act as lender of last resort. 
Basically, the national banking system did not provide an elastic money supply: banks were not 
able to expand money and credit as much as they wished, particularly in times of recession, when 
country banks responded to liquidity crises withdrawing their reserves, endangering the liquidity 
of also reserve city banks and central reserve city ones. 
 
At the time, the economy of the U.S. was dominated by two main financial aggregations. 
The first was the Morgan group, who began their activities by investment banking, then they 
expanded into commercial banking, railroads and mergers of manufacturing firms 
The second was the Rockefeller group, who began their activities by oil refining and then moved 
into commercial banking, investment banking and even railroads thanks to an alliance with Kuhn, 
Loeb & Company, another important investment bank. 
Even if they were competitors, they were eager to push and collaborate to obtain a banking reform. 
As soon as William McKinley was elected36, Morgan-Rockefeller forces began to organize a 
reform movement which focused in the Middle-West, to avoid the public suspicion of Wall Street 
centralization, and included both bankers, businessmen, economists and other academics as well. 
                                                
36 Morgan group supported McKinley for the presidential run. 
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In 1897, a convention was organized in Indianapolis. Representatives from 26 states and the 
District of Columbia were present. 
The Indianapolis Monetary Convention resolved to urge President McKinley to continue the gold 
standard and to appoint a new monetary commission with the task to prepare legislation for a new 
revised monetary system. 
The bill for a national monetary commission passed the House of Representatives but died in the 
Senate, thus the executive committee of the Morgan-Rockefeller movement decided to go ahead 
and select its own commission. 
$50.000 were raised throughout the nation’s banking and corporate community to finance the work 
of the Indianapolis Monetary Commission, that rented office space in Washington D.C. and set 
the staff for sending out and collating the replies to a detailed monetary questionnaire, which would 
have been sent to several hundred selected experts. 
At the end of 1897, the Commission published a preliminary report in which they recommended 
to codify and enact a single gold standard, with silver reduced to the status of subsidiary token 
currency, as well as a structural banking reform that allowed greater elasticity of the money supply.  
Thus, bank credit could have been increased in recessions and whenever seasonal pressure for 
redemption by agricultural country banks had forced other national banks to contract their loans. 
After the publication of the report, a second monetary convention was organized in Indianapolis. 
The second Indianapolis Monetary Convention was wider than the first one, since not only 
representatives of 31 states were present, but also top corporate leaders, as well as important 
economists. 
The purpose of this latter convention was to mobilize the nation’s leading businessmen into a 
mighty and influential reform movement. 
At the beginning of 1898 a second, final report was published and distributed. Not only did it come 
out in favour of a broadened asset base to link the emission of banknotes, it also called explicitly 
for a central bank with the monopoly of such emission. 
Meanwhile, the lobbying team of the monetary commission was extremely active.  
It sponsored several bills which were vainly presented to Congress by the Secretary of Treasure 
Lyman Gage, who was a strong supporter of the reforming movement. 
 
The first result of the monetary commission was achieved in 1900, when the “Gold Standard Act” 
was enacted after a huge mobilization of the national gold forces. 
It established gold as the only standard for redeeming paper money, with no retention of silver 
money except as tokens. 
This was only the first step on the path to a fundamental banking reform.  
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The American Bankers Association presented in 1902 the “Fowler Bill”, which contained three 
basic clauses. The first allowed the further expansion of national banknotes based on broader assets 
than government bonds. The second permitted national banks to establish branches at home and 
abroad, an illegal step under the existing system due to the opposition by the small country bankers. 
The third proposal was meant to create a three-member board of control within the Treasury 
Department to supervise the creation of new banknotes, as well as to establish clearinghouse 
associations under its aegis. 
The bill was defeated in Congress due to the opposition of the multitude of country bankers, since 
they wanted to avoid the competition of bigger banks in the form of branch banking. 
Therefore, bigger bankers decided to settle more modest goals, submitting the “Aldrich Bill”, 
which allowed the large national banks located in New York to issue emergency currency based 
on municipal and railroads bonds. However, even this bill did not pass. 
 
After this, they decided to turn temporarily to the executive branch. In 1903, they convinced the 
Secretary of the Treasure Leslie Shaw to try to make the Treasury work like a central bank, 
particularly in making open market purchases in case of recessions and in using the Treasury 
deposits to bolster banks, expanding the money supply. 
Basically, Shaw violated the statutory institution of the Independent Treasury System, which had 
tried to confine government revenues and expenditures to its own coffers.  
He expanded the practice of depositing Treasury funds in big national banks, lowering interest 
rates and leading so to an artificial expansion of credit. 
Even banking reformers denounced Shaw’s actions, as the economist Alexander Purves said:  
“The uncertainty as to the Secretary’s power to control the banks by arbitrary decisions and 
orders, and the fact that at some future time the country may be unfortunate in its chief Treasury 
official led many to doubt the wisdom.” 
The defeat of the “Fowler Bill” in 1902, coupled with the failure of Shaw’s attempts of 1903–
1905 to use the Treasury as a central bank, led the big bankers and their economist allies to adopt 
a new solution: the imposition of a central bank in the United States. 
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Bank reformers established a new restricted commission of five members37 and issued a new report 
that was presented to the New York Chamber of Commerce in 1906. 
It proposed again a central bank establishment under the control of the government and denounced 
the Treasury for overinflating by keeping interest rates excessively low, arguing that a central bank 
would have much larger capital and undisputed control over the money market. It would be able 
to manipulate more efficiently the discount rate, keeping the whole economy under proper control.  
In the meantime, short of establishing a central bank, the committee asked that national banks 
could issue notes using general assets as well as government bonds as collaterals. 
In 1906, the committee, together with the ABA, presented the proposal to the public, the press and 
Congress, but just as the sentiment for a broader asset currency became prominent, the bank 
reformers began to worry about an uncontrolled adoption of such a currency. National banks credit 
and notes were going to be expanded and, in the existing system, small state banks were going to 
be able to pyramid and inflate credit on top of the national credit, using the expanded national 
banknotes as their reserves. The reformers wanted a credit inflation controlled by and confined to 
the largest national banks, not an uncontrolled state bank inflation that would have siphoned 
resources to small entrepreneurs and speculative marginal producers. The problem was aggravated 
by the accelerating rate of increase in number of small Southern and Western state banks after 
1900. 
By the summer of 1907, a decline in influential banker support for broadening asset currency 
focalized the attention and the efforts of the reformers only toward a central bank project. 
 
A severe financial crisis, the Panic of 1907, struck in early October. 
The Panic of 1907 was provoked mainly by three events.   
The American money supply was put under pressure by both the reconstruction aids to San 
Francisco, after an earthquake hit the city in April 1906, and the Bank of England’s rising of 
interest rates.  
The “Hepburn Act”, which set maximum railroad rates, had become law by July 1906 and resulted 
in the depreciation of many railroad securities.  
These events had depressed the NYSE of about 18% between September 1906 and March 1907. 
 
 
                                                
37 This commission was composed by: Frank Vanderlip, a Rockefeller’s man; Jacob Schiff, head of the Kuhn, Loeb 
& Company; J. P. Morgan; George Baker of the First National Bank of New York, a Morgan’s closest associate; the 
former Secretary of Treasure Lyman Gage. 
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The Panic was triggered by the failed attempt in October 1907 to corner the market on stock of the 
United Copper Company. When this bid failed, the banks that had lent money to the cornering 
scheme suffered runs that later spread to affiliated banks and trusts, leading, a week later, to the 
downfall of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, the third largest financial institution in New York. 
The central role of New York City trust companies distinguishes the Panic of 1907 from earlier 
panics. Trust companies were state-chartered intermediaries that competed with banks for 
deposits. However, trusts were not a central part of the payments system and had a low volume of 
check clearing compared to banks. As a result, they held a low percentage of cash reserves relative 
to deposits but, since trust-company deposit accounts were demandable in cash, trusts were just as 
susceptible to runs on deposits as banks.  
Despite their minor role in the payments system, trusts were large companies and were extremely 
important for the financial system framework. As a matter of fact, trust companies loaned large 
sums directly in New York equity markets without requiring any collateral for these loans, which 
had to be repaid by the end of the business day. Brokers used that “fresh cash” to purchase 
securities for themselves or their clients and then used these securities as collaterals for a call loan38 
from a nationally chartered bank.  
The proceeds of the call loan were then used to pay back the initial loan made by the trust 
companies.  
Trusts were a necessary part of this process, because the law prohibited nationally chartered 
commercial banks from making uncollateralized loans or guaranteeing the payment of checks 
written by brokers on accounts without sufficient funds.  
The extra liquidity provided by trusts supported the daily transactions on the NYSE floor. 
Runs on trust company deposits, however, short-circuited their role as the initial liquidity provider 
to the stock market. 
 
The federal government suspended specie payments soon.   
The Treasury Department intervened with a $25 million deposit in New York banks and J. P. 
Morgan organized a pool of $10 million, but the efforts were insufficient to stop the panic.  
Public confidence needed to be restored somehow, since Morgan, the other banks and even the 
U.S. Treasury were low on funds.   
Bankers talked to the press to persuade people that the worst was behind and, on October 26th, the 
New York Clearing House issued $100 million in loan certificates to be traded among banks to 
settle balances, while allowing them to retain cash reserves for depositors.  
                                                
38 An overnight loan that facilitate stock purchases. 
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These actions led to a return of stability in Wall Street, although specie payments did not fully 
resume until January 1908, after considerable imports of gold.  
In November, a new set of crises emerged and J.P. Morgan played a critical role in each of them 
once again. By purchasing $30 million of bonds, Morgan precluded New York City from declaring 
bankruptcy39, while by organizing a $25 million loan to the Trust Company of America and other 
weak financial institutions, he stopped another potential bank run, thus preventing another stock 
market crash.   
By the end of the year, the Panic of 1907 had ended.  
 
After the panic, bankers and businessmen’s opinions consolidated stronger on behalf of a central 
bank: an institution that could have regulated the economy and served as a lender of last resort. 
During January 1908, the legislative lead in banking reform was taken by Senator Nelson Aldrich, 
who introduced the “Aldrich Bill” again, which focused on whether and on what basis the national 
banks could have issued special emergency currency.  
A compromise was reached and the “Aldrich-Vreeland Act” was finally enacted. 
This act allowed national banks to assemble national currency associations in groups of ten or 
more, with at least $5 million in total capital, in order to issue emergency currency.  
These banknotes were backed by government bonds, as well as any security banks held. 
The emergency currency had to go through a process of approval by the officers of the national 
currency associations and then distributed by the Comptroller of the Currency.  
A 5% tax on this emergency currency was placed for the first month it was outstanding, as well as 
a 1% percent increase for the following months.  
The Act, then, established the National Monetary Commission, whose task was to investigate the 
currency question, suggesting proposals for a comprehensive banking reform.   
The official members were made of an equal number of senators and representatives, but the real 
work was done by the staff appointed and directed by Aldrich, who determined that the 
Commission had to be run as an alliance of Rockefeller, Morgan, and Kuhn people.  
The National Monetary Commission spent much time in Europe conferring on information and 
strategy with the heads of large European banks and central banks.  
The Commission issued 30 reports from 1909 to 1912 that examined topics as U.S. financial laws; 
U.S. state banking statutes; Canadian banking history and the banking and currency systems of 
England, France, Germany and other European nations.  
                                                
 
39 Since New York City was in financial distress, it tried to raise money through a standard bond emission.  
However, it failed to gather enough financing and risked to go bankrupt. 
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The academic organizations were particularly helpful to the Commission, since they lent expertise 
to the endeavor, while on September 22th 1909, Wall Street Journal took the lead beginning a front-
page series on “A Central Bank of Issue”, which helped to widespread interest and discussion 
among a banking reform.  
At the end of 1910, the theoretical and scholarly groundwork was laid thanks to the numerous 
research volumes and reports spread in the market. It was time to formulate a concrete plan.  
In November 1910, a huge monetary conference was held, in conjunction with the New York 
Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants’ Association of New York. Economists, monetary 
analysts and representatives of the top banks in U.S. took part too.   
The formal sessions of the conference were organized around papers and related discussions. 
When the New York Monetary Conference ended, it was time for Aldrich and few other top leader 
of the financial elite40 to draft the central bank bill.  
Aldrich presented the plan to the full National Monetary Commission in January 1911.  
In the same year, even the National Board of Trade, the New York Chamber of Commerce, the 
Merchants’ Association of New York, the American Bankers Association and the New York 
Produce Exchange41 gave their endorsement to the banking reform.  
The Aldrich Plan was introduced to Senate in January 1912, but died quite quickly due to the 
change of the political control of Congress, which became Democratic after the elections in 1912. 
However, the reformers dropped the Republican name of Aldrich, asking their senator Carter Glass 
to make some adjustments to turn the bill into a Democratic measure.   
Finally, the “Federal Reserve Act” was signed by President Woodrow Wilson in December 1913. 
It created a system of private and public entities. It also established twelve private regional Federal 
Reserve banks42, each with its branches, board of director and district boundaries. 
The Federal Reserve Board, consisting of seven members, was created as the governing body of 
the FED. Each member had to be appointed by the President of the U.S. and confirmed by the 
Senate. 
 
                                                
40 The small work-group was composed by two Rockefeller men (Aldrich and Vanderlip), two Morgans (Davison and 
Norton), one Kuhn person (Warburg) and one economist friendly to both camps (Andrew). 
 
41 The New York Produce Exchange was founded in 1861 and served a network of produce and commodities dealers 
across the U.S. In the 1880s it had the largest membership of any stock exchange in the country. 
 
42 Boston; New York; Philadelphia; Cleveland; Richmond; Atlanta; Chicago; St. Louis; Minneapolis; Kansas City; 
Dallas and San Francisco.  
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The act created a new currency: the Federal Reserve Note, which could be issued by the Federal 
Reserve Banks at the discretion of the Federal Reserve Board. These notes are the banknotes 
currently used in the U.S. They are legal tender “for all debts, public and private” and they are 
backed by the assets of the Federal Reserve Banks, which serve as collateral43. 
Besides the Federal Reserve Note, the Act did not forbid the issuance of Federal Reserve Bank 
Notes, which differed from the former in that they were backed by only one of the twelve Federal 
Reserve Banks. They were backed using U.S. bonds, but they could not be issued by other national 
chartered banks. These notes are no longer issued, since the only U.S. banknotes still in production 
since 1971 have been the Federal Reserve Notes.  
The Act also provided many other functions and financial services for the economy, such as check 
clearing and collection for all member of the FED, with the goal of creating a national monetary 
system and financial stability. Basically, it established a huge American clearing house. 
As soon as it enacted the “Federal Reserve Act”, Congress required that all nationally chartered 
banks became members of the FED. These banks were required to purchase specified non-
transferable stock and to set aside an amount of non-interest-bearing reserves in their regional 
Federal Reserve banks.   
 
About 200 amendments were approved during the subsequent years. The most important changes 
were enacted in 1933 by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who extended the charter of the 
FED, which had been originally granted for twenty years, and established the Federal Open Market 
Committee, which consists of the Federal Reserve Board and five representatives from the Federal 
Reserve Banks with the power to direct all the open-market operations.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
43 These assets are generally Treasury Securities which are purchased by the FED to modify the money supply through 
open market operations. 
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THE ROLE OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT   
 
 
The Supreme Court of the U.S. has always played a critical role in U.S. history, especially in the 
early decades, when some constitutional principles needed to be interpreted for the first time. 
The Supreme Court can deeply affect all American institutions through its landmark decisions, 
since they establish a significant new legal principle or concept that change the interpretation of 
existing law. Such decisions may settle the law distinguishing a new principle that refines a prior 
one, or establishing a measurable standard that can be applied by courts in future decisions.  
The Supreme Court of each state of the federation may make such decisions too, particularly if the 
U.S. Supreme Court chooses not to review the case or if it adopts the holding of the lower court.  
Although many cases from state Supreme Courts are significant in developing the law of that state, 
only a few are so revolutionary that they announce standards that many other state courts choose 
to follow.  
The establishment of a central bank in the U.S. caused a grave constitutional argument soon. 
When the federal government chartered the First Bank of the U.S., the “Jeffersonians”44 argued 
that the Constitution did not give the federal government the power to establish such a bank.  
Hamilton defended its constitutionality using the “Necessary and Proper Clause”45, that is a 
provision located at section 8, clause 18, in the Article One of the American Constitution: 
“The Congress shall have Power … To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  
Hamilton thought that the bank was a reasonable means of carrying out powers related to taxation 
and funds borrowing, claiming that the clause had to be applied to activities reasonably related to 
several constitutional powers, not just to those that were strictly necessary to carry out expressed 
powers.  
 
                                                
44 The “Jeffersonians” were the militants of the Democratic-Republican Party, which used to fight strongly the 
economic decisions taken by the “Hamiltonians”, that were the militants of the Federalist Party.  
The “Jeffersonians” came to power in 1801, with the election of Thomas Jefferson in the 1800 presidential election.  
 
45 The draft of this clause provoked controversy during discussions of the proposed Constitution.  
While “Jeffersonians” and other Anti-Federalists expressed concern that the clause would have granted the federal 
government boundless power, “Hamiltonians” and other Federalists argued that the clause would only have permitted 
execution of power already granted by the Constitution. 
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Despite the “Jeffersonians” hostility to central banking, the Democratic-Republicans, under the 
control of quasi-Federalist moderates rather than militant Old Republicans, made no move to 
repeal the charter of the First Bank of the U.S. before its expiration in 1811. 
The Hamiltonian interpretation of the “Necessary and Proper Clause” won out officially in the 
decision taken by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in “McCulloch vs. Maryland.”  
 
This landmark decision was taken in 1819, following the attempt by the State of Maryland to 
impede operation of a branch of the Second Bank of the U.S., imposing a tax on all notes issued 
by banks not chartered in Maryland. As a matter of fact, state banks in Maryland didn’t want to 
face the competition of the Second Bank of the U.S. branch, thus they put pressure on state 
government early on.  
 On February 1818, the General Assembly of Maryland passed the act, which provided: 
“Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland that if any bank has established or shall, 
without authority from the State first had and obtained establish any branch, office of discount 
and deposit, or office of pay and receipt in any part of this State, it shall not be lawful for the said 
branch, office of discount and deposit, or office of pay and receipt to issue notes, in any manner, 
of any other denomination than five, ten, twenty, fifty, one hundred, five hundred and one thousand 
dollars, and no note shall be issued except upon stamped paper of the following denominations; 
that is to say, every five dollar note shall be upon a stamp of ten cents; every ten dollar note, upon 
a stamp of twenty cents; every twenty dollar note, upon a stamp of thirty cents; every fifty dollar 
note, upon a stamp of fifty cents; every one hundred dollar note, upon a stamp of one dollar; every 
five hundred dollar note, upon a stamp of ten dollars; and every thousand dollar note, upon a 
stamp of twenty dollars; which paper shall be furnished by the Treasurer of the Western Shore, 
under the direction of the Governor and Council, to be paid for upon delivery; provided always 
that any institution of the above description may relieve itself from the operation of the provisions 
aforesaid by paying annually, in advance, to the Treasurer of the Western Shore, for the use of 
State, the sum of $15,000.  
And be it enacted that the President, cashier, each of the directors and officers of every institution 
established or to be established as aforesaid, offending against the provisions aforesaid shall 
forfeit a sum of $500 for each and every offence, and every person having any agency in circulating 
any note aforesaid, not stamped as aforesaid directed, shall forfeit a sum not exceeding $100, 
every penalty aforesaid to be recovered by indictment or action of debt in the county court of the 
county where the offence shall be committed, one-half to the informer and the other half to the use 
of the State...” 
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James McCulloch, head of the Baltimore Branch of the Second Bank of the U.S., refused to pay 
the tax and Maryland sued him. The state of Maryland argued that the Constitution did not 
explicitly give the federal government the authority to charter a bank, since this power was 
reserved only for the states. As a result, the Second Bank of the U.S. was deemed to be 
unconstitutional.  
The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the state’s position and the case was appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, who wondered whether Congress had the power under the Constitution to 
incorporate a bank even though that power is not explicitly granted in the Constitution;  
Additionally, it wondered whether the State of Maryland, or any other one, have the power to tax 
an institution created by Congress as a result of congressional powers established by the 
Constitution.  
The Court unanimously determined that Congress did have the power to create the Bank.   
Chief Justice John Marshall supported this conclusion with four main arguments:  
 
1. He argued that historical practice gave Congress power to create the Bank, since Congress had 
enacted the First Bank of the U.S. after great debate and it had been approved by a clever executive 
with very convincing arguments;  
 
2. He held that the sovereignty of the Union lay with the people of the U.S., not with the individual 
states that comprised it. He saw the U.S. as a nation of “constitutional sovereignty” with its 
authority resting exclusively with the people who created and were governed by the Constitution. 
“The government of the Union is a government of the people; it emanates from them; its powers 
are granted by them and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”  
Maryland tax violated constitutional sovereignty because it acted as a levy against all people in 
the U.S. by a state accountable to only some of the people.  
Stating that “the power to tax involves the power to destroy”, Chief Justice Marshall said that the 
states “have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede or control the laws of the federal 
government.”  
 
3. He admitted that the Constitution did not explicitly enumerate the power to create a central bank, 
but he said that this is not dispositive as to Congress power to establish such an institution. “In 
considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a Constitution we are expounding.” 
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4. In liberally interpreting the “Necessary and Proper Clause”, the Court rejected Maryland’s 
narrow interpretation of the clause. According to the Court, the word “Necessary” in the clause 
did not refer to the only way of doing something, but rather applied to various procedures for 
implementing all constitutionally enumerated powers.  
Basically, the Court argued that Congress possessed implied un-enumerated powers not explicitly 
outlined in the Constitution; therefore, the Second Bank of the U.S. was appropriately related to 
the enumerated powers to tax and to spend, to borrow and coin money as well as to regulate 
interstate commerce.  
“McCulloch vs. Maryland” remains today a fundamental and binding cornerstone of American 
constitutional law, as the court expanded Congress powers to include those implied by the 
Constitution, established the inferior status of the states in relation to the Union and set the 
constitutional sovereignty of the federal government.  
 
After the end of the Civil War, the question of the constitutionality of legal tender of the 
greenbacks came before the courts of several states. In the large number of state court decisions 
before 1870, every Republican46 judge upheld their constitutionality, whereas every Democratic47 
judge declared them unconstitutional. The greenback question reached the Supreme Court of the 
U.S. in 1867 and was decided in 1870, in the case of “Hepburn vs. Griswold.”  
The lawsuit originated when Mrs. Hepburn attempted to pay a debt to Henry Griswold.  
The debt had been made prior to the issuance of the greenbacks that the case questioned.   
When Hepburn tried to pay the debt, she tendered to Griswold the amount in greenbacks, which 
had depreciated a lot in terms of specie, but they had been made legal tender by the “Legal Tender 
Act.”  
Griswold sued Hepburn, refusing Hepburn’s tender of U.S. notes to satisfy his claim.  
The case reached the Supreme Court of the U.S., that stated that while the federal government was 
authorized to coin money and emit bills of credit backed by specie, that power was distinct from 
the power to make paper legal tender, which was not authorized under the Constitution.  
The court found out that the treatment of notes as legal tender represented an impairment to 
enforcing the obligations of contracts, which therefore violate the spirit of the Constitution. 
                                                
46 The Republican Party was founded in 1854 by anti-slavery activists, economy modernizers and other two minor 
parties, the Whigs and the Free Soilers. The Republicans dominated politics nationally and in the majority of the 
northern states for most of the period between 1860 and 1932. 
 
47 The Democratic Party is the oldest political party of the world. It was founded in 1828 by some supporters of 
Andrew Jackson. It was initially a conservative party, which used to back up slavery and then racial segregation. 
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The decision held by a vote of 5-3 and followed the California Supreme Court one in 1862, whose 
judges ruled that greenbacks could not be accepted in state or county taxes, since the state 
constitution prohibited any acceptance of paper money for taxes.  
The state of Oregon followed California’s lead immediately, since Oregon’s Constitution had also 
outlawed banks of issue paper money not entirely backed by specie. In 1862, the Oregon Supreme 
Court ruled that greenbacks could not be received in payment of taxes.  
The Grant administration was very upset by “Hepburn vs. Griswold”, as well as the railroads, that 
had accumulated heavy long-term debts, which had to be paid in more valuable gold. 
However, there were two vacancies in the Court, one of which was created by the retirement of 
one of the judges who had been favorable to the unconstitutionality of the “Legal Tender Act.” 
President Grant appointed two Republican judges and the new Court reconsidered the question, 
reversing the previous judgement in 1871, when another debt repayment case reached the Court. 
“Knox vs. Lee” was an important legal tender case, since the Supreme Court of the U.S. overruled 
“Hepburn vs. Grinswold”, holding that making paper money legal tender through the “Legal 
Tender Act” did not conflict with the Constitution.  
Thus, the Court asserted that the “Legal Tender Act” had represented a justifiable use of federal 
power at a time of national emergency, as the Civil War was.  
 
“McCulloch vs. Maryland” and “Knox vs. Lee” were the most significant cases concerning the 
monetary policy of the U.S.A.  
Federal government was therefore allowed to establish a central bank or, as the “National Banking 
Act” provided, to charter national banks.   
Moreover, the federal government was legally allowed to make notes legal tender from then on in 
case of emergency, as during financial panics. 
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THE SUFFOLK SYSTEM: A “FREE MARKET CENTRAL BANK”  
 
 
During the free banking age, tons of different banknotes circulated in the American largest 
financial centers, like Boston. Focusing on Boston area, some notes were issued by Boston banks 
which were aware of being solvent, while others were issued by other state-chartered banks. The 
latter could be quite far away. Such distance impeded both general knowledge about their solvency 
as well as easy access in bringing the banknotes in for redemption.  
Since these country banknotes were initially accepted in Boston at par value, some faraway banks 
began to issue notes which were not backed by specie.   
Country banknotes began to be traded at discounts to par until city banks finally refused to accept 
country banknotes altogether.  
This gave rise to the birth of money brokers, but it also caused a big issue for Boston merchants. 
As a matter of fact, they were supposed to accept country banknotes with uncertain real value. 
When they exchanged the notes with the brokers, they ended up assuming the full cost of 
discounting the bills they had accepted at par.  
In 1814, the New England Bank of Boston announced it would have gone into the money broker 
business, accepting country notes from holders and turning them over to the issuing bank for 
redemption. However, the holders still would have had to pay the cost of the operation. 
In 1818, a group of merchants founded the Suffolk Bank to do the same thing.  
The enlarged competition brought the rate of discount of country-notes down up to bare one half 
percent in 1820, but country banks did not begin to behave more responsibly in their notes creation. 
By the end of 1820, the business became so unprofitable that both banks stopped competing with 
the private money brokers.  
 
During the next several years, city banknotes represented an even smaller part of the total New 
England money supply. Country banks issued far more notes in proportion to their capital than 
were the Boston banks.  
Since they were concerned about a forthcoming huge depreciation wave, both the Suffolk Bank 
and the New England Bank began to purchase country notes again in 1824. This time they did so 
not to make a profit on redemption, but to reduce the number of country notes in circulation in 
Boston. 
They were certain that this action would have increased the use of their notes, boosting so their 
own loans and profits.  
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However, the more they purchased country notes, the more notes of even worse quality replaced 
them. Buying the latter involved more risk, so the Suffolk Bank proposed to six other city banks a 
joint fund to purchase and send these notes back to the issuing bank for redemption. 
The seven banks, known as the Associated Banks, raised $300,000 for this purpose. 
The operations began in March 1824, when the Suffolk Bank began acting as agent, buying country 
notes from the other six banks. The volume of country notes bought increased to $2 million per 
month until 1825.  
By then, the Suffolk Bank felt strong enough to go it alone. Furthermore, it now had the leverage 
to pressure country banks into depositing gold and silver in order to become member of the  
so-called “Suffolk system” and thus to make note redemption easier.   
By 1838, quite all New England’s banks had redeemed their notes through the Suffolk Bank.  
Each country bank had to maintain a permanent deposit of specie of at least $ 2,000, plus enough 
specie to redeem all its notes that the Suffolk Bank received, while city banks only had to deposit 
a fixed amount, which decreased to $5,000 by 1835. These gold and silver deposits did not need 
to be deposited necessarily in the Suffolk Bank, as long as they were at some place convenient to 
Suffolk, so that the notes would not have had to be sent home for redemption.  
Basically, nearly all reserves were deposited at the Suffolk Bank.  
No interest was paid on any of these deposits, but in exchange the Suffolk Bank agreed to accept 
at par all the notes it would have received from banks, crediting the depositor banks accounts on 
the following day.   
The Suffolk Bank, therefore, started acting as the first de-facto clearing house in the U.S., 
accepting, sorting and crediting banknotes. As a consequence, it was now possible for any New 
England bank to accept notes of any other bank, even if it was far away, at face value. The 
discipline enacted by the Suffolk Bank virtually made all banknotes in New England equal to their 
face value, thus creating a uniform currency.  
Before the appearance of a uniform currency, not only did the large amount of different banknotes 
cause confusion on their value, but it also led many criminals to counterfeit banknotes creating an 
ever-present risk of accepting banknotes that was not worth what they claimed.  
After the system became in place, the role of counterfeiting in the New England area fell 
dramatically. 
The practices of the Suffolk Bank led the New England area to succeed much better than the rest 
of the country even during bank panics.   
These practices included lending reserves to other banks and keeping the payment system 
operating, as the New York Clearing House also would have done from the 1850s.  
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In the Panic of 1837, for instance, none of the Connecticut banks failed, nor did they suspended 
specie payments and, when in 1857 specie payment was suspended in Maine, all but three banks 
remained in business.   
The biggest, most powerful weapon the Suffolk Bank owned to keep stability was the power to 
grant membership into the system. It accepted only banks whose notes were sound. 
While the Suffolk Bank could not prevent a bad bank from inflating, denying it membership 
ensured that its notes would not have enjoyed wide circulation.  
Furthermore, the member banks that were mismanaged could be excluded from the list of Suffolk-
approved New England banks in good standing. This could cause an offending bank notes to trade 
at a discount at once, even though the bank itself might still redeem its notes in specie.  
The Suffolk Bank exercised a stabilizing influence on New England economy even controlling the 
use of overdrafts in the system.   
If a member bank needed money, it could apply for an overdraft, that is, a portion of the excess 
reserves in the banking system. If the Suffolk Bank decided that a member bank’s loan policy was 
not conservative enough, it could refuse to sanction that bank application to borrow reserves at the 
Suffolk Bank. The denial of overdrafts to wasteful banks forced those banks to keep their assets 
more liquid.  
The Suffolk Bank could earn huge extra interest income profit by issuing overdrafts irresponsibly. 
However, if a member bank failed, the Suffolk Bank would be stuck with losses on its banknotes 
held on its balance sheet, as well as any overdraft granted to that bank. The losses would be borne 
by the Suffolk Bank alone, not mutually by all members as in a mutual guarantee system. Potential 
losses could have been quite substantial, so the Suffolk Bank used to maintain a conservative 
lending policy year after year.   
In any case, the Suffolk Bank earned a lot loaning out the reserve deposits which Suffolk itself did 
not pay interest on. At its peak, in 1858, this income amounted to more than $1 million.   
Not surprisingly, Suffolk stocks used to be the highest priced bank stocks in Boston and, by 1850, 
regular dividends used to be about 10%.  
 
The Suffolk system was also able to provide notes redemption much more cheaply than the U.S. 
government would have done during the National Banking system.  
Indeed, John Kay Knox, U.S. comptroller of the currency from 1872 to 1884, stated: 
“In 1857 the redemption of notes by the Suffolk Bank was almost $400 million as against $140 
million in 1875, the highest amount ever reported under the National Banking system.  
The redemptions in 1898 were only $66 million, at a cost of $1.30 per thousand.  
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The cost of redemption under the Suffolk system was $0.10 per thousand, which does not appear 
to include transportation.  
If this item is deducted from the cost of redeeming National banknotes, it would reduce it to about 
$0.95. This difference is accounted for by the relatively small amount of redemptions by the 
Treasury, the increased expense incident to the necessity of official checks by the Government and 
by the higher salaries paid.   
However, allowing these differences, the fact is established that private enterprise could be 
entrusted with the work of redeeming the circulating notes of the banks, and it could thus be done 
as safely and much more economically than the same service can be performed by the 
Government.”   
The average volume of redemptions per year during Suffolk’s existence (1825-1858) was about 
$230 million, while the national banking system one from 1863 to 1898 was only $54 million. 
At its peak in 1857, the Suffolk Bank was able to redeem $400 million, even if the New England 
money supply was only $40 million. This meant that the average note was redeemed ten times per 
year: once every five weeks.  
Since the Suffolk system put limits on the amount of notes country banks could issue, they tried 
to hinder it, taking legal actions.  
However, the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld in 1827 Suffolk’s right to demand gold or 
silver for country banknotes and the state legislature initially refused to charter a country banks 
clearing system, probably assuming that those banks would have run much less strict operations.  
However, after 30 years, the balance of power in the state legislature shifted outside of Boston, to 
country banks areas. Now, politicians were willing to support country banks desires. 
Furthermore, the extraordinary profits and power that the Suffolk Bank obtained year after year 
attracted in 1858 a big competitor: the Bank for Mutual Redemption.  
Trying to force the new competitor out of the business, the Suffolk Bank refused to redeem notes 
of banks that had owned deposits in the newcomer. The Suffolk Bank began even to threaten any 
bank that withdrew deposits from it, but country banks rallied to the newcomer and, on October 
1858, the Suffolk Bank announced it was going to stop clearing any country banknotes, thus 
becoming just another “normal” bank.   
Although the Suffolk system was established privately, the system of centralizing reserves among 
only a small number of banks developed into modern American banking legislation.  
The Suffolk system was responsible for both creating strong banking techniques and making 
smaller banks responsible for all of their notes issued. It created a uniform currency throughout 
New England and, most importantly, it helped leading U.S. banking practices into what they are 
today. 
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DO THE U.S. NEED A CENTRALIZED BANKING SYSTEM? 
 
 
After the banking panics that hit the U.S. economy until the 1860s and during the Civil War 
liquidity crisis, the American financial establishment decided to create a more effective and 
reliable centralized banking system than the First and the Second Bank of the U.S. used to be.  
The latter were short lived due to the conflict of interests scandals that crushed the boards of 
directors and the politicians involved, as well as the great political influence that the hard money 
approach gained year after year.  
Even though the “National Banking Acts” laid the groundwork for the modern American system 
of central banking, several economists in the 19th and in 20th century, as Murray Newton 
Rothbard48, called it into question.   
 
In his book “A History of Money and Banking in the United States before the Twentieth Century”, 
Rothbard  reasoned about the National Banking system, explaining that the outcome of this system 
was to create an inverted pyramid of country banks expanding on top of reserve city banks, which 
in turn expanded on top of few central reserve city banks.  
Before the Civil War, every bank had to keep its own specie reserves, and any pyramiding of notes 
and deposits on top of that was limited by calls for redemption in specie by other competing banks 
as well as third parties, as the money-brokers.  
However, with the “National Banking Acts”, reserve city banks could keep half of their reserves 
as deposits in the central reserve city banks, and country banks could keep most of theirs in one or 
the other, so that as a result, all national banks in the U.S. could pyramid in two layers on top of 
the relatively small base of reserves in the central reserve city banks.   
Furthermore, those reserves could consist of inflated greenbacks as well as specie.  
 
                                                
48 Murray Newton Rothbard (1926 – 1995) was an American hard-money economist of the Austrian School, 
philosopher, political theorist and historian. He played a leading role in the development of modern libertarianism, 
asserting that all services provided by the states could have been provided more efficiently by the private sector.  
He strongly opposed central banking and fractional reserve banking, supporting a 100% reserve banking system. 
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A simplified schematic diagram can clarify Rothbard thinking:   
    
  
 
 
 
In the system before the Civil War, every bank could pyramid notes and deposits on top of specie, 
but its room for such inflationary expansion was limited, since any bank’s expansion would cause 
increased spending by its clients on the goods or services of other banks. Notes or checks on the 
expanding bank went into the coffers of other banks, which called on the expanding bank for 
redemption, at a certain point.   
This put severe pressure on the expanding bank, endangering the redemption of all its liabilities, 
declining its reserve ratio and so forcing it to either contract its loans and liabilities or to go into 
liquidation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The latter figure depicts the inverted pyramid of the National Banking System. 
Central reserve city banks pyramided notes and deposits on top of specie and greenbacks; reserve 
city banks pyramided their notes and deposits on top of specie, greenbacks and deposits at central 
reserve city banks; and country banks pyramided on top of both. This means that, for example, if 
central reserve city banks had inflated and expanded their notes and deposits, they would not have 
been checked by other banks calling upon them for redemption.  
Notes and Deposits 
Specie 
Reserves: Specie and Greenbacks 
Central Reserve City Banks 
Reserve City Banks 
Country Banks 
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On the contrary, reserve city banks could expand their own loans and liabilities by pyramiding on 
top of their own increased deposits at central reserve city banks. In turn, country banks were able 
to inflate their credit by pyramiding on top of their increased deposits at both reserve city and 
central reserve city banks.  
Basically, the whole nation could inflate uniformely and relatively unchecked by pyramiding on 
top of a few central reserve city banks. 
National banks were not compelled to keep part of their reserves as deposits in larger banks, but 
they used to do it because, in the long run, they could expand uniformly on top of the larger banks; 
in the short run because of the advantages of having a line of credit with a larger bank as well as 
earning interest on demand deposits at that bank49.  
Rothbard brought another example to corroborate his theory: if country banks had begun with $1 
million in vault cash as their reserves, with the National Banking System in place, they could have 
deposited three-fifths, or $600,000 of their cash reserves in reserve city banks, in return for 
interest-paying demand deposits at those banks.  
Total reserves for the two sets of banks would not have changed. However, because the country 
banks could use as their reserves deposits in reserve city banks, the same total reserves could be 
used by the banks to expand their credit. For now, $400,000 in cash (what would remain in country 
banks vaults after depositing $600,000 in reserve city banks) would support the same number of 
notes and deposits that the country banks had previously backed by $1 million. If reserve city 
banks had started with $1.8 million in reserves, they could have expanded $2.4 million on top of 
the new $600,000 received by the country banks. 
In short, country bank reserves would have remained the same, but reserve city bank reserves 
would have increased and they could have pyramided on top of that. 
Furthermore, reserve city banks could deposit half of their reserves at central reserve city banks. 
After they had done that, the latter could have increased their total notes and deposit further. 
In short, not only the national banking system allowed pyramiding the entire banking structure on 
top of a few large banks, but it also allowed a multiple expansion of all bank liabilities by 
centralizing a large part of the nation’s cash reserves from the individual little banks into the hands 
of the larger ones. 
 
 
 
                                                
49 Banks generally paid interest on demand deposits until the practice was outlawed in 1934. 
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Rothbard also criticized also the fact that every national bank’s expansion of notes was tied strictly 
to its ownership of U.S. government bonds. Every bank could have issued notes if it had deposited 
an equivalent of U.S. securities as collateral at the U.S. Treasury,50 so that national banks could 
have expanded their notes only to the extent that they purchased U.S. government bonds.  
This provision tied the national banking system deeply to the federal government and, more 
particularly, to its expansion of public debt.  
The federal government obtained an ever-present market for its debt, and the more the banks 
purchased the debt, the more the banking system could inflate. According to Rothbard, monetizing 
the public debt was not only inflationary, but it also provided the basis, when done by the larger 
city banks, for other banks pyramiding on top of their own monetary expansion. 
 
Furthermore, every national bank was obliged to redeem the obligations of every other national 
bank at par. The federal government could not make the notes of a private bank legal tender until 
1871, however it used to confer quasi-legal tender status on every national bank by agreeing to 
receive all its notes and deposits at par for dues and taxes.51 
Rothbard stated: “[…]it is interesting and even heartening to discover that despite these enormous 
advantages conferred by the federal government, national banknotes fell below par with 
greenbacks in the financial crisis at the end of the 1860s, and a number of national banks failed.” 
In his opinion, even if national banks were required to redeem the notes and deposits of every other 
national bank at par, it was still difficult to them to do it.  
One of the problems of the pre-Civil War state banking system was that interstate or even intrastate 
branches were illegal, thereby hindering the redemption process. 
With the national banking system, branch banking continued to be prohibited52. As a matter of 
fact, a bank could have redeemed its notes only as its own counter in its home office.  
Moreover, the redemption of notes was crippled by the fact that the federal government imposed 
a maximum limit of $3 million a month by which the amount of national banknotes could have 
been contracted and, thus, redeemed. 
                                                
50 Originally national banks could issue notes to the value of 90% of their U.S. government bonds. This limitation was 
changed to 100% in 1900. 
 
51 Except, of course, for payment of customs duties, which had to be paid in gold, to build up a fund to pay interest on 
the government debt in gold. 
 
52 Congress eliminated federal restrictions on interstate banking and branching in September 1994, with the enactment 
of the “Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act.” 
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Rothbard has always criticized the banking policy of the U.S., whenever a system of central 
banking was taken into consideration by the legislator. 
According to him, any system without a central bank is safer and more efficient. 
As an economist of the Austrian School, he was firmly convinced that the private sector was indeed 
fully able to establish an efficient system of banking and clearing, as the Suffolk Bank actually 
did. As a matter of fact, the Suffolk Bank proved that private individuals acting outside of political 
were able to provide the same functions of a central bank, at lower costs.  
In addition, a free banking system is safer because every bank is constrained first, by the fear of a 
bank run53, but can also be constrained by the fact that, in a free market, the clientele of a bank is 
extremely limited. The more banks and the fewer the clientele of each, the less room exists for 
fractional reserve inflation, since any bank would be afraid of a call for redemption of its banknotes 
by the other ones.  
Therefore, in this system, issuing banknotes not covered by specie could be very harmful. 
For these reasons, free competition could and generally would result in banks voluntarily keeping 
higher reserve ratios. Free banking would be a regime of hard money and low inflation. 
 
According to Rothbard, the essential purpose of central banking consists in using government 
privilege to remove the limitations placed by free banking on monetary and bank credit inflation. 
The central bank receives from the government the monopoly privilege for issuing banknotes or 
cash, while other privately-owned commercial banks are only permitted to issue demand liabilities 
in the form of checking deposits. 
If a client of a commercial bank wanted to cash his deposits for paper money, he could not obtain 
notes from his own bank, because that bank could not issue them. His bank would have to obtain 
the paper money from the central bank “buying” it, either by selling the central bank various assets 
or by drawing down its own checking account with the Central Bank. 
According to Rothbard, the central bank would not be able to control properly the money supply. 
Under central banking, a demand for cash and the subsequent issue of new cash would have the 
paradoxical effect of lowering the money supply indeed, because of the bank’s need to maintain 
their reserve/deposit ratios. How would it be possible? 
Rothbard brought a clear example. If a customer of a commercial bank wanted to shift $500,000 
of demand liabilities from deposits to notes, his bank should draw down by the same amount its 
fraction of reserve/deposits with the Central Bank to get the banknotes. 
                                                
53 Without a central bank or another institution operating as a lender of last resort, banks would be bound for liquidation 
in case of an uncontrollable bank run. 
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The immediate effect would be that nothing would change. The central bank would have $500,000 
less owed to the bank, but it would print $500,000 of new Central Bank notes, which would be 
redeemable in gold to members of the public, who could cash them in through their banks or even 
at the offices of the central bank itself. 
However, the bank fraction of reserves/deposits would be sharply lowered. Under central banking, 
any bank must maintain a certain fraction of reserves/deposits, because it is legally forced to do 
so. 
Since the bank must remain at a specific fraction of reserves/deposits, it should meet this situation, 
for instance, failing to renew its loans or selling its bonds or other assets in the market. 
In this way, it would contract the total money supply of the country. 
Conversely, the deposit of cash by the public would have the opposite inflationary effect, for the 
bank’s reserve/deposits ratio would rise and the banks would be able to expand their loans and 
issues of new deposits. 
Total money supply only includes money held by the public: demand deposits and Central Bank 
notes54. It does not include demand deposits of the banks at the Central Bank or vault cash held by 
the banks. Including them in the money supply would be a mistake, just as it would be double 
counting to include both gold in the banks and warehouse receipts for gold as part of the money 
supply in gold standard systems. 
According to Rothbard, if the public was or became unwilling to hold any money in bank deposits 
or notes and insisted on using only gold, even under central banking, the inflationary potential of 
the banking system would be severely limited. Even if the public insisted on holding banknotes 
rather than deposits, fractional reserve banking expansion would be limited.  
Conversely, the more the public was willing to hold checking accounts rather than cash, the greater 
would be the inflationary potential of the central banking system. 
 
The central bank, at least under the gold standard, could still go bankrupt if the public insisted on 
cashing in their deposits and Central Bank notes for gold. 
However, such bankruptcy is very unlikely. As a matter of fact, the government confers to the 
Central Bank great prestige using it for its own deposits and conferring the monopoly privilege of 
note issue. 
Furthermore, the government confers another privilege on the Central Bank. It makes its notes 
legal tender for all debts, even if, under gold standard, they had been incurred initially in specie. 
                                                
54 Even gold coin or bullion held by public must be counted in the total money supply, until a nation maintains a gold 
standard. However, in the example of Rothbard, the hypothetical nation is taken off this system. 
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Given these powers, the Central Bank can always intervene to bail out banks in trouble, providing 
them resources by purchasing their assets or lending them reserves. 
Therefore, a moral hazard issue must be faced.  
Economist Paul Krugman described moral hazard as “any situation in which one person makes 
the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly.”  
As a matter of fact, financial bail outs of lending institutions by the Central Bank could encourage 
risky lending practices very often, since those who have taken the risks have come to believe that 
they would not have to carry the full burden of potential losses. 
According to Rothbard, in a free banking system, one bank’s expansion and risk-taking would 
meet a sever shock by other banks calling upon it for redemption, while under central banking, all 
banks could expand together, on top of new reserves that the Central Bank decided to pump in. 
The Central Bank would eliminate hard and non-inflated money, creating a coordinated bank credit 
inflation throughout the nation. 
 
In 1983, after depicting the problems of central banking, Rothbard proposed in his book “The 
Mystery of Banking” even his solution to restore a sound non-inflationary banking system in the 
U.S.  
First, the country should have returned to a “true” gold standard, in which the dollar should have 
been redeemable on demand not only in gold bullion, but also in gold coin.  
There should have not been any provision for emergency suspensions of redemption55. Otherwise, 
everyone would have lost confidence in the gold standard stability. 
However, a crucial question remains: since the dollar should have been defined as a unit of weight 
of gold, what definition should have been chosen? 
Rothbard proposed that the most convenient definition was the one that could enable, at one and 
the same time, to return to a gold standard, to denationalize gold and to abolish the system of 
central banking. 
 
Private American citizens used to own gold until 1933, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
outlawed the private ownership of gold coins, gold bullion and gold certificates forcing them to 
sell them to the Federal Reserve56. 
                                                
55 President Richard Nixon unilaterally suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold in 1971. By that year, 
the Bretton Woods system was replaced de facto by a regime based on freely floating fiat currencies that remains in 
place to the present day. 
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Actually, the main rational of the “Executive Order 6102” was to remove the constraint on the 
FED which prevented it from increasing the money supply, since it had almost hit the limit of 
allowable notes that could have been backed by gold in its possession. If gold could not be legally 
owned, then it could not have been legally redeemed, thus it could not have constraint the Central 
Bank. 
Rothbard has always considered this action a huge theft, so, in order to separate the government 
totally from money, he proposed to return to people its hoard of gold; that is, denationalization. 
Then, he wrote: “What better way to denationalized gold than to take every aliquot dollar and 
redeem it concretely and directly in the form of gold? And since demand deposits are part of the 
money supply, why not also assure 100% reserve banking at the same time by disgorging the gold 
at Fort Knox to each individual and bank holder, directly redeeming each aliquot dollar of 
currency and demand deposits?”  
The new dollar price of gold should have been defined so that there would have been enough gold 
dollars to redeem every note and demand deposit. 
Then, the FED should have been liquidated, since it would have lost all gold reserves redeeming 
its notes and giving to banks enough gold to have 100% reserve behind their demand deposits, 
liquidating so all their deposits at the FED. 
After that, Rothbard thought that a legislation which would have held fractional reserve banking 
as a fraud and would have enforced 100% reserve of gold would have not entailed any deflation 
or contraction of the money supply.  
Once again, banks would have been free, as they were before the Civil War, to issue banknotes. 
Much of gold in the hands of the public after liquidation of FED notes would probably have found 
its way back to the banks in exchange for banknotes backed 100% by gold. 
Moreover, Rothbard proposed two other useful things in order to complete entirely this process. 
First, every kind of lender of last resort, as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation57, should 
have been abolished, so that no government guarantee could have “protected” bank inflation, or 
tried to prevent bank runs assuring that banks would have remained sound and non-inflationary.  
                                                
56 Since the gold held by the FED increased from $4 billion to $12 billion over the short term, the federal government 
needed a place to store it. In 1936, the U.S. Treasury Department established in Kentucky the United States Bullion 
Depository, known also as Fort Knox. 
 
57 The FDIC was created by the 1933 “Banking Act” during the Great Depression to provide deposit insurance to 
depositors in U.S. banks and to monitor the banks which were not supervised by the FED or the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency. It still operates nowadays. 
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Second, the U.S. Mint should have been abolished and the job of minting or melting down gold 
should have been turned over to privately competitive and more efficient firms. 
Rothbard concluded that “Only such a plan would totally separate money from the pernicious and 
inflationary domination of the State.” 
 
Even if Rothbard’s economic theories have been harshly criticized by other economists, as the 
Keynesians, he was one of the most important exponents of the Austrian School and the founder 
of the Anarcho-capitalism, a political philosophy that advocates the elimination of the state in 
favor of self-ownership, private property and free markets. 
He was able to mix the economic approach with his philosophical one, facing both economic topics 
as central banking and fractional-reserve banking, and also history and politics. 
He wrote over twenty books on political theory, revisionist history, economics and other subjects 
as civil rights and criminal justice, playing a seminal role in the development of modern 
libertarianism. 
He was also the pupil of Ludwig Von Mises, another important economist of the Austrian School, 
and he mentioned Aristotle, John Locke, St. Thomas Aquinas, Lao Tzu, Gustave De Molinari, 
Frédéric Bastiat and Carl Menger as his sources of inspiration. 
Rothbard built some of the most important exponents of current Austrian School and Anarcho-
capitalism as Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Walter Block, Lew Rockwell, Justin Raimondo and David 
Friedman, the son of Milton Friedman. 
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By the enactment of the “National Banking Acts”, the American banking industry has been 
addressed towards a centralized system. Despite all the disapprovals concerning central banking 
issues, this system seems the only one that can work properly.  
Initially, as depicted by Alexander Hamilton, the central bank was necessary only to make loans 
to the government, to allow the public debt repayment, to act as custodian of federal funds and to 
collect tax revenues for the government. Basically, it used to be the “operative arm” of the 
Treasury. 
However, with the establishment the FED, the field of action of the central bank was officially 
enlarged.  
Finally, it has been fully able to affect the money supply through both open market operations and 
changes in interest rates, as well as acting as lender of last resort during economic recessions.58 
As Thomas Humphrey59 stated: “The primary function of the lender of last resort is to prevent 
credit crises from becoming monetary crises, i.e., to prevent credit/debt contraction from 
producing monetary contraction. Thus, while it should prevent system-wide runs on banks, large-
scale collapses of asset prices, loans, and credit, its ultimate purpose is to prevent collapses of 
money to promote monetary stability.” 
In his paper “The Lender of Last Resort: A Historical Perspective”, Humphrey summarized the 
theories of other two important defenders of the central banking system: Henry Thornton and 
Walter Bagehot. 
The latter was a British journalist, businessman and essayist who wrote extensively about 
government, economics and literature during the Nineteenth Century. In his book “Lombard 
Street: A Description of the Money Market”, Bagehot clearly explained how a central bank should 
operate, concentrating mainly on its role as lender of last resort. 
He provided very interesting arguments that could solve some of the issues of central banking as, 
for instance, moral hazard. 
 
 
 
                                                
58 Even if the previous central banks, as well as the Independent Treasury System, could manage the money supply as 
well, only the FED was implemented with the specific purpose of providing an elastic money supply, especially during 
economic recessions.  
 
59 Thomas Humphrey (1935 - …) is an American economist, considered one of the masters of the history of monetary 
economics. Until 2005, he has been a research advisor and senior economist in the research department of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond. 
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In his opinion, the central bank should bear the responsibility of guaranteeing the liquidity of the 
whole economy but not that of particular institutions. He prescribed last-resort lending as a remedy 
solely for pervasive general emergencies affecting the entire banking system. He did not prescribe 
the remedy for isolated emergency situations affecting an individual bank or a few specific banks, 
nor did he intend it to be used to prevent large banks from failing as a consequence of poor 
management and inefficiency. Basically, he emphasized that the task of the central bank was not 
to prevent initial failures, but rather to avoid subsequent waves of failures spreading through the 
system, in order to minimize as much as possible moral hazard. 
The idea is that central banks could mitigate economic crises that might occur in any system, 
because of their legal privileges and the stronger confidence of the public in their notes.  
If banks were forced to contract their lending in order to protect their reserves during bank runs, 
the central bank could step in and prevent a deflationary spiral, because its notes would be accepted 
without question. In the worst case, redemption could be suspended.  
The central bank could thus prevent liquidity shortages and severe economic downturns. 
 
Bagehot also refined Henry Thornton’s60 analysis, adding substance to his central bank doctrine. 
First, he argued that the lender of last resort’s duty should not stop with the provision of liquidity 
in times of crisis, but he also involved, making it clear in advance, that it would lend freely in all 
future crises. As he put it: “[…] The public have a right to know whether the central bank, the 
holder of our ultimate bank reserves, acknowledge this duty and are ready to perform it.” 
The assurance alone, he thought, would dispel uncertainty about and promote confidence in the 
central bank’s willingness to act, thus generating a pattern of stabilizing expectations that would 
help to avoid future panics. 
 
Secondly, he advocated that the central bank has a duty to lend, but it should extract a high price 
for its loans, requesting a penalty interest rate. 
Such a penalty rate would ration scarce liquidity to its highest-value uses as a high price rations 
any scarce commodity in a free market. Moreover, it would encourage the importation and prevent 
the exportation of specie, thus protecting the nation’s gold reserves. It would achieve this latter 
result by attracting short-term capital from abroad and by exerting a deflationary influence on the 
level of economic activity and domestic prices, thereby spurring exports and reducing imports and 
thus improving the external balance of trade. 
                                                
 
60 Henry Thornton (1760 – 1815) was a British economists, banker, philanthropist and parliamentarian.  
He is considered the father of modern central banking. 
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A penalty rate would also ensure the quick retirement of emergency expansions of the note issue 
once the emergency ends due to the very unprofitability of borrowing at the above-market interest 
rate. 
The resulting loan repayment would extinguish the emergency issue so that the money stock would 
return to its noninflationary path. 
Moreover, the high rate of interest would reduce the quantity of precautionary cash balances that 
overcautious people would want to hold. Without the high rate to deter them, these people might 
deplete the central gold reserve. 
Last but not least, the penalty rate would provide an incentive for banks to exhaust all market 
sources of liquidity and even develop new sources before coming to the central bank.  
By encouraging individual banks to develop better techniques of money management and the 
capital market to develop new channels to mobilize existing liquidity, the penalty rate would 
promote allocative efficiency in the financial system. 
According to Humphrey, “Bagehot analysis implies still another use for the penalty rate: 
providing test of the soundness of distressed borrowers. A penalty rate set a couple of percentage 
points above the market rate on alternative sources of funds would encourage illiquid banks to 
turn to the market first. Success in obtaining accommodation at the market rate would indicate 
that lenders judge these borrowers to be a sound risk. The borrowers and their assets would pass 
the market test. On the other hand, resort to the central bank would tend to indicate weaknesses 
in the borrowing institutions. The banks may be unable to borrow in the market at the lower rate. 
Fearing default, lenders may demand a risk premium in excess of the difference between the 
market and the penal rate. The risk premium would force the stockholders or the banks to make a 
decision either to close the banks, to arrange a merger with other banks, or to resort to the central 
bank’s lending facility. Either way, the penalty rate will have provided a test of the banks’ 
soundness.” 
 
Bagehot’s third contribution was his specification of the types of borrowers the central bank should 
accommodate, the kinds of assets it should lend on and the criteria it should use to determine the 
acceptability of those assets. 
As far as the type of borrowers is concerned, Bagehot stated that the central bank should be willing 
to accommodate anyone, as its objective in time of panic is to satisfy the market’s demand for 
liquidity. Therefore, it makes no difference, whether this objective is accomplished via loans to 
merchants, to bankers or to whomever. 
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As for the type of collateral on which the central bank would lend, Bagehot thought that it should 
stand ready to lend on any sound assets, not only on government securities. This consideration 
implies that the central bank should not be afraid to extend loans on normally assets whose current 
market value is temporarily below book value due to the economic crisis. 
As he stated: “The amount of the advance is the main consideration...not the nature of the security 
on which the advance is made, always assuming the security to be good.” 
 
Bagehot also provided a precise delineation of the extent of the lender of last resort’s responsibility 
to individual banks as distinguished from the banking system as a whole.  
The central bank’s duty is not to rescue “the ‘unsound’ people who constitute a feeble minority.” 
Such businessmen, he said, “Are afraid even to look frightened for fear their unsoundness may be 
detected. It is the sound people, the people who have good security to offer, who constitute the 
majority to be protected.” 
In short, the job of the central bank would not be to prevent failure at all costs but rather to confine 
the impact of such failure to the unsound institutions alone. Bagehot meant for his strictures to 
apply even to those key banks whose failure, in the absence of central bank action, could shatter 
public confidence and start a sequence of financial collapses. 
The lender of last resort function should not be interpreted to mean that unsound banks should not 
be permitted to fail. Instead, it implies that failure should not be allowed to spread to sound 
institutions. 
To Bagehot, this distinction is crucial. ln his words, “No advances need to be made on assets on 
which the central bank will ultimately lose.” He was firmly sure that if the lender of last resort 
refused bad bills or bad securities, it would not make the panic worse, since it would be sufficient 
for the central bank to guarantee liquidity to solvent merchants and bankers, who would comprise 
the great majority of the market.  
Bagehot stated that the basic strength of the banking system should not rest on the availability of 
last resort accommodation, but rather on the resources and soundness of the individual banks. 
“Under a good system of banking... a large number of banks, each feeling that their credit was at 
stake in keeping a good reserve, probably would keep one; if anyone did not, it would be criticized 
constantly, and would soon lose its standing, and in the end, disappear.”  
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In 1936, Vera Smith61 published her book “The Rationale of Central Banking and the Free 
Banking Alternative”, written under Friedrich von Hayek at the London School of Economics. 
The book covers the history of free banking in the Nineteenth Century and reviews the theoretical 
arguments both for and against the idea of free banking. In particular, Smith identified some main 
arguments that can justify the existence of a central bank in the market. 
The first argument runs as follows. In a system of free banking, which might be stable as a whole, 
we can expect individual banks to fail from time to time, just like there are bankruptcies in other 
sectors of the economy. If some banks issued notes over and above their own gold reserves, they 
would risk going bankrupt. Furthermore, the notes would not stay exclusively in the hands of the 
clients of those banks but they would circulate in the market. Whoever held the notes at the point 
of bankruptcy would carry the loss.  
It seems reasonable to assume that the risk would not be evenly spread over the economy.  
Those individuals who, for whatever reason, would be least capable of bearing the additional cost 
of discriminating between notes from solvent and insolvent banks would be hit the hardest. 
Therefore, the government should introduce some uniformity in the note emission as well as the 
distribution of risk over market participants. This can be done by imposition of a legal monopoly, 
that is, by creating a central bank. 
 
Historically, the most important argument for central banks has been the one about the dangers of 
over-emission of notes and thus excessive credit expansion. As a matter of fact, Smith stated that,  
in a free banking system, there would be strong incentives for any individual bank to constantly 
lower their discount rates and thereby expand credit in order to gain market share. At a certain 
point of the process gold reserves would start to drain, and banks would have to refrain from further 
credit expansion in order to protect their own reserves. This would lead to an economic crisis. 
Under free banking, the fluctuations in the money and credit supply would thus be much more 
violent, which would imply larger instability of the economy as a whole.   
A central bank would serve the purpose of preventing excessive note issue and credit expansion 
as well as the resulting interplay of inflationary and deflationary episodes.  
 
                                                
61 Vera Constance Smith (1912 – 1976) was a British economist. She married Friedrich Lutz, a German economist. 
Together they published several researches as “Theory of Investment of the Firm” and “Italy, a Study in Economic 
Development”, which is focused on the differences between Northern and Southern Italy and the monopolistic 
behavior of Italian industry at the time.  
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Although the Suffolk system was a great regulator of unsound banking practices, it lacked the 
ability to properly administer the total volume of banknote circulation. The Suffolk system 
regulated how many banknotes could be issued by country banks, but it was ineffective regulating 
their circulation. It has been considered by some economists as Wilfred Lake a “good regulator 
of a bad system.”62  
 
Other arguments supporting the central bank existence are related to the monetary policy.  
According to Smith, it would be beneficial to pursue an active and rational monetary policy of 
controlling the volume of cash reserves and credit guided by “scientific criteria.”   
A central bank would be indispensable for its implementation only if it was independent.  
If the central bank was put under government control, as in the past, politicians could be tempted 
to use its power to finance expenditures or to reduce public debt burden through inflation, not to 
keep the money supply under control.  
Ceding power over monetary policy to a central bank with strong insulation from interference from 
the rest of the government would be a useful step to reduce the frequency and severity of 
destructive inflationary episodes.  
Then, if any country had a central bank, it would be easier to cooperate with regard to international 
monetary policy decisions in order to prevent crises driven by external imbalances in the balance 
of payments, as rapid shifts in capital flows. 
 
Since banks play a dominant role in the financial system, there are very strong reasons for 
independent central banks to act as lender of last resort, as well as to pursue a monetary policy that 
can try to stabilize as much as possible the financial market.  
In the last decades, the central bank has acquired another important task that is still debated 
nowadays: banks supervision and regulations. 63    
Even if some economists think that this task should be entrusted to the government, some others 
think that the power to put regulations on banks has some synergies with the core monetary policy 
responsibilities of the central bank. As a matter of fact, for instance, the central bank can modify 
the money multiplier simply changing the reserve ratios banks must respect. 
 
                                                
62 Lake Wilfred. “The End of the Suffolk System”, on “The Journal of Economic History”, volume 7, November 1947. 
 
63 Actually, in the U.S., banks are supervised by three federal regulators: the FED, the FDIC and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency.  
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FINAL REFLECTIONS 
 
“I never make the same mistake twice. I make it five or six times, just to be sure.” 
This funny quote of Bill Murray should be born in mind when examining the history of American 
banking, at least the years covered in the first chapter. 
Clear recurring events can be noticed when examining all the main panics in the history of the 
U.S. until 1907. As a matter of fact, every recession was triggered by overextended banks and their 
bankruptcy, as well as the failures of fraudulent financial operations. 
 
PANICS TRIGGER EVENT 
Panic of 1792 
Failure of the scheme of some banks to control 
the U.S. government securities market and 
Duer’s bank bankruptcy 
Panic of 1819 
Massive contraction of credit by the Second 
Bank of the U.S. due to credit overextension 
Panic of 1837 
Banks impossibility to redeem their notes in 
specie and subsequent bankruptcies 
Panic of 1857 
Bankruptcy of the Ohio Life Insurance and 
Trust Company 
Panic of 1873 Bankruptcy of the Jay Cooke & Company 
Panic of 1884 
Bankruptcy of the Marine National Bank of 
New York City 
Panic of 1907  Failure to corner the market by a pool of banks  
 
 
The summary table shows an important thing. Before thinking about the existence of a central 
bank, a country should check if the legislation that avoids fraudulent operations and credit 
overextension is working properly or not.  
According to Rothbard, this kind of legislation is useless in a free banking system, since free 
market frameworks can prevent these problems through the threat of a feasible bankruptcy. 
As a matter of fact, a lender of last resort would not exist in this system, so banks should face 
liquidation whenever they could not assure the redemption of notes. 
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However, Rothbard did not take into consideration some important points. 
Even if the Suffolk System and clearing houses almost eliminated the problem of the “wildcat 
banks” 64,  during the American free banking period banks continued to grant risky loans and were 
forced to suspend specie payments several times. 
As a matter of fact, during the railway boom in the nineteenth century, banks were so attracted to 
the growing market huge profits that they began to overextend credit and buy a lot of railway 
bonds, swelling financial bubbles. 
Whenever people put pressure on the redemption of notes, banks either went bankrupt or suspend 
specie payments, creating a short circuit in the credit market. Afterwards, after the situation had 
stabilized, this cycle was going to start again. 
To tell the truth, Rothbard proposed a legislation that would hold fractional reserve banking as a 
fraud and would enforce 100% reserve of gold. If this legislation had been enforced very 
effectively, it could have definitely solved the problem of notes redemption, since every banknote 
would have been backed by gold. However, I think that it could not solve the problem of credit 
overextension.  
In my opinion, banks, like people, have a propensity for believing that when economy is booming, 
investments will have a tiny percentage to fail. Basically, they underestimate the magnitude and 
probability of potential losses. Banks are tempted to invest money in risky business just to obtain 
a higher profit. If these investments fail, they will have to face the specter of bankruptcy.65  
The only way to solve this problem is to enforce a strong legislation that helps to monitor banks 
constantly. They should invest in a project only if the percentage of success is high enough to 
prevent the liquidation of the investments from causing the liquidation of the bank itself. 
This first consideration leads to a second issue that Rothbard did not touch. The social costs of a 
bank failure. 
Even if we assumed that year after year, free banking would learn from its errors, becoming solid 
and reliable, the costs of this process would be huge. 
Whenever a bank failed, the contagion would spread to the entire credit market, causing several 
firms to go bankrupt too as well as widespread unemployment. 
                                                
64 They were banks which printed notes not covered by specie, exploiting the distance that people had to travel to 
redeem their notes. 
 
65 We can take as an example the crisis of the subprime mortgages in 2007, that caused the bankruptcy of the Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. and the Great Recession that hit the U.S. and the European economies. 
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The potential growth lost during the economic recessions cannot be recovered anymore in the 
future. Basically, people should bear economic crisis and years of wasted growth in order to allow 
the free banking system framework to work properly.  
Is a central bank necessary to solve these problems? I think no. 
Theoretically, governments could establish an administrative agency with the task of preparing a 
properly legislation. The office could work together with the judiciary in order to enhance its 
influence and its power to enforce such a legislation. 
Despite all the regulations, in a free market a bank could fail anyway, as a firm in any other 
business can. Since the financial market is the driving force of the whole economy, a lender of last 
resort is necessary to smooth the crisis. However, the lender of last resort could be the government 
itself or a specific administrative agency, not necessary a central bank. Additionally, it should 
operate respecting fully the “Bagehot Dictum”, to limit as much as possible moral hazard. 66 
In short, we are imaging a banking system without a central bank, but with strong and efficient 
regulations as well as a lender of last resort that operates following the principles of Bagehot. 
If we supposed that banks were obliged to maintain a 100% reserve ratio, the system could operate 
efficiently. 
 
Anyway, the monetary system in which this banking system would operate must be taken into 
consideration. 
In a gold standard, every banknote would be covered by gold, but the money supply would depend 
on the amount of gold in circulation, not on the path of the economy. In this way, the main problem 
would be deflation in periods of shortage of gold. Deflation damages debtors, causing borrowers 
to cut spending to service their debts or to default. If borrowers decided to reduce the demand of 
loans, the whole banking system would be in trouble. 
Additionally, cyclical economic downturns are unavoidable. However, the lender of last resort 
could not smooth such crises in case it had not enough gold. This would be a severe issue, since 
Bagehot stated that the lender of last resort should make it clear in advance that it would lend 
freely in all future crisis. Otherwise, it would be meaningless. 
In the past, the American government used to solve this situation allowing specie suspensions 
periods or printing banknotes not backed by gold, as greenbacks during the Civil War. 
Basically, it used to move the gold standard towards a fiat standard. 
                                                
66 The FED has not always acted respecting such principles. For instance, during the “Great Recession”, it accepted 
also junk bonds as collaterals for liquidity injections. 
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In the latter monetary system, the redemption of banknotes in gold is officially suspended. 
Economic recessions could be faced in a more efficient way because the lender of last resort could 
provide liquidity very quickly. As a matter of fact, it should only print notes and, then, put them 
into circulation. However, fiat money has a big drawback.  
In this regime, the problem would be inflation. Since every bank would have no limit on the 
emission of notes, the money supply could easily get out of control without properly supervision. 
Inflation damages creditors, so the banking system would be in trouble once again. 
The government could solve the problem giving temporary legal tender only to the banknotes 
printed by the lender of last resort, turning it into a central bank. 
The central bank should be an independent institution and could also assume also the role of 
banking regulator in order to manage the money supply in every possible way, even working on 
some restrictions like reserve requirements. 
In short, I think that in the system depicted by Rothbard an independent central bank would be 
useful in order to manage the money supply in case of big liquidity injections and then to help 
returning to a gold standard. 
During the Civil War, a big monetary crisis happened because the government acted as a sort of 
central bank, issuing greenbacks and suspending specie payments, but it also failed to do two 
important things: 
1. in those years, every bank could issue notes, so a massive quantity of worthless paper circulated 
in the market. Gresham’s Law triggered and gold began to flow out of the U.S.; 
2. greenbacks were backed by government credibility, which became very low soon, since it began 
to finance war expenditures mainly through emission of notes whose redemption was postponed 
several times. 
In this situation, a credible central bank would have been very useful to solve the crisis faster as 
well as to prevent the over-emission of notes pursued by banks.  
 
Nowadays, there are still big debates on central banking and free banking pros and cons. 
I think that a central bank is essential nowadays too, because the global monetary system has been 
a regime based on freely floating fiat currencies since 1973.  
Moreover, the quantity of money in the system is huge and must be monitored as much as possible 
in order to persevere price stability. 
However, the money supply can get out of control, despite central banks presence.  
As a matter of fact, they have not always respected Bagehot principles as well as set monetary 
policies properly.  
 68 
In any case, central banks have to face thousands of variables every time they have to set a bespoke 
monetary policy. Timing, for example, is crucial.  
If the FED injected billions of dollars in the market to face an economic recession, after several 
months, it should decide when to reduce or to stop this injection of money.  
If the FED decided to act to soon, it could revive the crisis. Conversely, it could cause a big 
inflation wave. Central banks are led by human beings, and humans can make mistakes sometimes. 
Some economists argue that the central bank should not act as lender of last resort, as well as 
contribute to enact and then enforce banking regulations. 
Even if these functions could be reasonably executed by other institutions, I think that a central 
bank can pursue them in the best way because they are strictly correlated. 
As a matter of fact, efficient regulations can contribute both to manage better the money supply 
and to prevent bank crises, that will have to be solved by the central bank itself.  
Finally, I think that central banks should have all the instruments to analyze the market in which 
they operate day after day. In this situation, they would be able to know the essential market in 
which it must operate better than the market itself. 
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